

2024

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION REPORT

MONITORING OF HATEFUL CONTENT



stowarzyszenie
żydowskie
czulent

MONITORING OF HATEFUL CONTENT DURING THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION

REPORT

Warning: This report includes content that could be considered brutal and profane. Sensitive or younger people are advised to view the report with caution. Viewer discretion is advised. We do not intend to offend anyone, but to act to educate and inform.

Copyright © by Jewish Association Czulent
Publisher
Jewish Association Czulent
ul. Sebastiana 36/1
31-051 Kraków
www.czulent.pl
office@czulent.pl

Kraków 2024
Edition I

Drawn up by: Joanna Grabarczyk-Anders, Mikołaj Henryk Winiewski
Project team: Joanna Grabarczyk-Anders, Mikołaj Henryk Winiewski
Copy editing and proofreading: Dominik Wodz
Cover design, graphic design, typesetting, make-up and DTP: Konrad Grajner

Free publication, not for sale.

All rights reserved. Reprinting, copying, abridging, or use of this text, in whole or in part, is permitted only for non-commercial purposes, provided that proper attribution is given to the original source.

Responsibility for the content of this publication lies only with its authors.
ISBN 978-83-931879-9-7

Support our organisation by donating to our account:
Jewish Association Czulent
ul. Sebastiana 36/1
31-051 Kraków
NIP (tax ID): 6762300850
Account No.: 42 1600 1462 1880 9351 6000 0001



stowarzyszenie
żydowskie
czulent



Centrum Badań
nad Uprzedzeniami

This publication has been produced within the framework of the project “Online antisemitism in Poland: establishment of a legal aid helpdesk, reporting and advocacy activities”, funded by the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future (EVZ), and implemented by the Jewish Association Czulent with expert support from the Centre for Research on Prejudice. Project funded by the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future (EVZ).



Foundation
EVZ
Remembrance
Responsibility
Future

This publication does not present the position or views of the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future (EVZ).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	6
FOREWORD	8
METHODOLOGY	9
STUDY OBJECTIVE	9
GLOSSARY	10
NATIONAL GROUPS AND MINORITIES	12
SPECIFICITY AND ORIGIN OF DATA	12
CORPORA	12
KEY PHRASES IDENTIFYING POLITICIAN ACCOUNTS	15
ACTIVITY	16
ANALYSIS – INDICATORS	17
LIMITATIONS OF WEB CONTENT RESEARCH	18
STUDY RESULTS	19
NEGATIVE CONTENT: SCALE AND COMPARISON BETWEEN THE GROUPS	19
ANALYSIS OF CHANGES	21
ANTISEMITIC CONTENT	21
ANTI-REFUGEE AND ANTI-MUSLIM CONTENT	29
ANTI-UKRAINIAN CONTENT	34
ANTI-LGBT+ CONTENT	37
FINAL CONCLUSIONS	41
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT “COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO COUNTER ANTISEMITIC HATE SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC SPACE”	43
JEWISH ASSOCIATION CZULENT	44
CENTRUM BADAŃ NAD UPRZEDZENIAM I	44
LIST OF FIGURES	45
LIST OF TABLES	46

INTRODUCTION

We present another report in our series on monitoring hateful content in election campaigns, highlighting the significant rise in hate speech, which particularly intensifies with each new political campaign, a trend that deepens the social divide.

Hatred, and especially antisemitism, is used not only as a tool to polarise the society, but also a means of mobilising voters. The analysis of antisemitism in the context of Polish politics and social attitudes is especially relevant given its increasing instrumentalisation and the role it plays in shaping the political landscape.

This was particularly evident during the 2020 presidential election, as noted by observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), who pinpointed antisemitism as a key element in political discourse at that time. It is also worth noting that the Polish debate on antisemitism often attempts to downplay its presence by referring to 'real' antisemitism in other European countries, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. However, antisemitism in Poland and the Visegrad countries has distinct characteristics and manifests in unique ways.

Contemporary antisemitism in Poland is not only highly politicised but also serves as a tool for disinformation, social polarisation, and voter mobilisation. Such practices affect attitudes toward ethnic minorities and can contribute to an increased approval for violence against them, posing a real threat to public order and democracy. The growing popularity of hateful content also erodes the sense of security in groups that are particularly vulnerable to discrimination.

In response to these challenges, the Jewish Association Czulent has launched monitoring of hate speech as part of a pilot project aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the issue and addressing it within Polish society. In this publication, we present the results of our research in the hope that politicians and decision-makers will engage in a meaningful discussion about crimes motivated by prejudice.

We would like to highlight the need to treat this problem as a significant threat to public safety. Disinformation, generating intergroup conflict, and fuelling unrest in communities are all serious challenges. We encourage Polish political parties to implement internal procedures for monitoring their content to avoid unconsciously spreading stereotypes about different social groups. Such practices are successfully used by some political parties in other countries, which monitor and regulate the content published by their members.

You are welcome to read the report and join the discussion on countering antisemitism and other forms of discrimination. We also encourage awareness-building activities among politicians and in their election campaigns, as they have a significant impact on public attitudes and can contribute to the escalation or mitigation of intergroup conflicts.

FOREWORD

We are witnessing an ever-growing impact of social media on citizen attitudes, views, as well as their consumer and political choices. Today, social media sites have established themselves among primary channels for communication with voters, the media, and election campaigners. For a significant portion of the society, they also serve as the sole source of information.

Since 2014, we have been watching the online landscape in Polish for hateful and prejudice-motivated content. As an organisation that monitors the scale of antisemitic incidents, we have noted a temporary surge in user activity on social media, accompanied by smear campaigns against minority groups, as well as community leaders, whistleblowers, and individuals.

This led us to pose research questions: is antisemitic and hateful content present in online political discourse? Does the volume of hateful mentions increase as an election campaign progresses? What prejudices mobilise voters and internet users? Is hate being employed as a political tool to influence voters? Does hateful content targeting specific minorities rise as an election campaign begins? Are campaigns built on hate? We decided to investigate this.

To address these questions, we conducted a study of Polish-language content on X (formerly Twitter), as the most politically engaged online platform.

Our monitoring focused on minority groups that experienced violence and had been vilified online, also in political contexts.

This report is the second election campaign monitoring exercise carried out by our teams.

METHODOLOGY

STUDY OBJECTIVE

The objective of the study was to answer the questions: Is hateful content targeting different social groups present in online political debate? Does the volume of hateful mentions increase when an election campaign begins? Does the volume of hateful content decrease as the election campaign comes to an end? What prejudices mobilise voters and internet users? To investigate this, we gathered data from Polish-language online posts.

We chose to analyse X (formerly Twitter) due to its political significance, the frequent use of the platform by politicians as a primary source of communication, and the public nature of all posts. Additional advantages included the availability of the site's API to researchers and the exceptional activity of most registered election committees and candidates during the elections.

The study utilised publicly available user posts on X (formerly Twitter). The data are public and were shared by signed in and verified platform users. The mentions were aggregated using SentiOne Listen – AI online listening.

Our study covered a period of 70 days (from 15 May 2024 to 23 June 2024), which included the formal election campaign, the election day, and the post-election period. We focused on posts with hateful and negative content targeting selected minority groups. The hateful content analysed and cited in this report retains its original spelling and has been censored.

GLOSSARY

Anti-LGBT+: This term refers to rhetoric that includes homophobic, transphobic, and queer-phobic statements, demonstrating hostility, intolerance, or discrimination against individuals based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression. The term includes negative rhetoric including stereotyping, name-calling, encouragement of verbal and physical violence, and incitement to practices that exclude LGBT+ people from society or restrict their rights and freedoms.

Antisemitic content: This term refers to any content that manifests a hateful attitude and actions directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals, their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. Using the IHRA's working definition of antisemitism¹, antisemitic content includes stated attitudes, encouragement of actions or rhetoric manifesting hatred of Jews and their community. Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic, unless it has discriminatory or stereotyping features. Antisemitic content can take many forms, such as inciting violence, spreading lies or stereotypes, denying the Holocaust, accusing Jews of conspiring against humanity or applying double standards to Israel and the US.

Anti-Muslim: This term refers to stated attitudes, encouragement of actions or rhetoric manifesting hostility, violence, social exclusion, stereotyping, prejudice, intolerance, or incitement to discrimination against those who believe in Islam, those who identify as Muslims, or those categorised as such.

Anti-refugee: Anti-refugee content refers to all forms of communication, including statements and texts that contain explicit dislike, hostility, or negative stereotyping of refugees or asylum seekers, as well as content inciting violence or discrimination against refugees, dissemination of untrue information aimed at demonising or discrediting refugees, and expressing negative opinions or prejudices against this group of people.

Feminatives: The Jewish Association Czulent prioritises the use of inclusive and balanced language. Therefore, neutral linguistic forms and feminatives are used throughout the report. The masculine gender was applied to plural nouns.

1. In its activities and research, the Jewish Association Czulent uses IHRA's working definition of antisemitism: "Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities."

Minority groups: A term referring to diverse communities which are numerically smaller in size or whose members are perceived to have an inferior social status compared to the dominant group in society. In the context of this report, it includes national minorities, ethnic minorities, migrants, and people identifying as LGBT+.

Hateful and negative content: For the purposes of the study, we assumed that hateful and negative content is to be understood as any published comments that spread and promote hatred or target minority groups and disseminate negative attitudes and stereotypes.

Examples of hateful and negative content (original spelling, censored²):

- *Jakubiak should f*cking smash him in that empty Jewish head.*
- *You kike, as a Jewish kike, didn't you think of joining the IDF as a citizen of those wh***s, your homeland is calling you, get the f*ck out of Poland and there you can finally be yourself. Only once there, you may not be able to grope like you do here, you pervert. Hoick, you trash*
- *Millions from Soros to support activists helping illegal migrants <https://t.co/uMmRLQhjAO> Now this 'border' group can be put in jail because they are actively involved in human smuggling. This kike should be locked up, too.*
- *You disgusting, corrupt fa***t. History will also judge you, you degenerate scumbag.*
- *Not only a Jewish faggot but also a f*cking retard, you are so f*cked up in your head.*
- *But he's such a fa***t with a face that begs for a fist, his Russian wife left him because she saw that he's a wanker and his brains are as efficient as a Negro's at a math competition. Who from the Confederation is supposed to adore him?*
- *Oh, that's exactly the point. I won't have any fa***t, Yid or leftward telling me how to live my life.*
- *Those f*cking wh***s won't stop with Palestine and now they want to take Yemen, and then turn Poland and Ukraine into Ukropolin and these Zionist nazis want to have heavenly Jerusalem by the Black Sea F*cking Jewish imperialism in a nutshell*
- *Intruders can be shot without dehumanising them. Precisely because they are human beings and not mindless cattle they should be shot at. Put up a sign with a head and a bullet hole for the illiterate, and problem solved. Pregnant women are also to be shot at.*
- *Stop calling them migrants at last! They are terrorists, bandits, murderers attacking the border of the Polish Republic! Start shooting at them! Shoot to kill!*

Mention: Any statement or post made on a social media site that contains search terms or key phrases. The mentions used in this report are publicly available and have therefore been selected. The original spelling of the mentions is preserved, however, they have been censored where necessary to protect personal data or remove profanity.

2. Censoring refers to the practice of masking vulgar words and words that are commonly considered offensive.

NATIONAL GROUPS AND MINORITIES

The monitoring included posts about the following groups and related topics: Jews and Israel, refugees, migrants and Muslims, Ukrainians and Ukraine, and LGBT+ people.

SPECIFICITY AND ORIGIN OF DATA

Only content written in Polish language was studied. Graphics, videos, links, etc. were not analysed. In all phrases used to create the corpus (a set of statements), the original spelling was preserved. All content used in the report originates from X (formerly Twitter) and from publicly available accounts. The data were aggregated using SentiOne Listen – AI online listening.

Corpora

The corpus for each group was created on the basis of two types of key phrase searches:

1. posts relating to a group,
2. posts relating to specific politicians and political parties. When searching for phrases, the scripts were based on keywords for the group and politicians concerned.

In this manner, corpora were produced that contain all mentions of a particular group and all mentions of selected representatives of each grouping and official profiles of each party.

In each category, we excluded content that coincided linguistically with the topic of the study, but had a different meaning.

Examples of exclusions in the category “Jews, Judaism and Israel” (original spelling):

- content relating to silk garments;
- content relating to people named Jude;
- fungal infection of the skin (Polish: ‘parch’, a derogatory term for a Jew);
- Fungal diseases of fruit plants, such as scab (Polish: ‘parch’, a derogatory term for a Jew);
- etc.

Key phrases related to Jews, Judaism and Israel

Phrases about Jews were based on keywords identifying mentions of this group, such as all variations of the words *‘Żyd’*, *‘Izrael’* and *‘Izraelczyk’* (‘Jew’, ‘Israel’, and ‘Israeli’), as well as related (including derogatory) expressions, such as *‘Żydek’*, *‘Izraelita’*, *‘Judejczyk’* (all are pejorative names for a Jew or Israeli). Ethnophaulisms (derogatory labels) such as *‘Parchy’* and *‘Chachły’* were also included. Keywords additionally included different spelling variants that are often used online, such as *‘7ydzi’*, *‘rzytów’*, *‘ysrael’*.

Based on literature and analysis of online content, including posts on X (formerly Twitter), we identified labelling phrases used to describe Jews that do not directly refer to ethnic names, and we included them in the search, such as *‘żmijowe plemię’* (translating as viper tribe), *‘Chazarzy’* (Khazars), *‘żymianie’* (a wordplay combining Jews and Romans, hereinafter translated simply as ‘Romans’). Additionally, we included phrases that identify the most common Jewish-related topics on the Polish internet (based on a review of mentions from the last 10 months). These topics included: the Holocaust, discussions around the Jedwabne pogroms, the Just 447 Law, the Righteous Among the Nations, various conspiracy theories (e.g., references to the ‘Elders of Zion’ or *‘ukropolin’*), along with public figures such as Soros and the Rothschild family, who are often mentioned in the context of conspiracies.

Key phrases related to Ukrainians and Ukraine

Phrases related to Ukrainians and Ukraine were based on keywords identifying the group, such as all variations of the word *‘Ukrainiec’* (Ukrainian) and *‘Ukraina’* (Ukraine), supplemented by derogatory labels like *‘ukry’*, *‘upadlina’*, *‘rezun’* and others.

The subjects of mentions were identified based on qualitative analysis (1,000 posts drawn from the initial selection). Only threads present in more than 10% of the mentions were taken into account.

Hate speech – all unique keywords referring in a negative and non-specific way to Ukraine, Ukrainians or related topics (such as *‘ukry’*, *‘upadlina’*, *‘rezuny’*, *‘szoszony’*).

Volhynia – all mentions of the tragic historic events in Volhynia in 1944 or the Polish-Ukrainian historical debate [e.g.: *‘Wotyń’* (Volhynia), *‘UPA’* (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), *‘Bandera’* (Stepan Bandera), *‘Banderland’*].

Russo-Ukrainian War – all mentions of the war (*#tonienaszawojna* (it’s not our war), *#stopukrainizacjipolski* (stop the ukrainisation of Poland), *‘Ukraine + war’*).

Key phrases related to refugees and migration

Phrases related to refugees, migrants and Muslims who are equated with refugees were based on keywords identifying the group, such as all variations of the words *'uchodźca'* (refugee), *'migrant'*, *'muzułmanin'* (Muslim). They were supplemented by derogatory and offensive terms such as *'nachodźca'* (a wordplay combining the words 'refugee' and 'invader'), *'ciapaty'* (wog, Paki), *'muzułmany'* (a derogatory term for Muslims), etc.

Based on qualitative analysis, four distinct topics were identified to arrange the negative keywords.

Hate speech – generally negative, spiteful or offensive epithets, such as *'kozojebcy'* (goat f*ckers), *'nachodźcy'* etc., as well as negative expressions co-existing with emigration or refugee-related statements, such as *'arabusy'*, *'ciapate'*, *'islamy'*, etc.

Scandal – all mentions referring to migration scandals, such as the cash-for-visa scandal, or relocation, such as *'dziurawa granica'* (porous border), *'afery wizowa'* (cash-for-visa scandal), *'mafia wizowa'* (the visa mafia). The last two topics involved mentions highlighting migration or refugees in the context of the problem, some in a neutral way – e.g., *'kryzys migracyjny'* (migration crisis), *'relokacja'* (relocation), *'plot na granicy'* (border fence), and other in a definitely negative way – np. *'zalew'* (deluge), *'fala'* (wave), *'horda'* (horde), *'najeźdźcy'* (invaders) (combined with the words 'emigration' or 'refugees').

Key phrases related to LGBT+ people

Phrases related to the LGBT+ community were based on keywords identifying the group, such as all variations of the words 'LGBT', *'gej'* (gay), *'lesbijka'* (lesbian), *'trans'*. They were supplemented by derogatory and offensive terms such as *'ideologia LGBT'* (LGBT ideology), *'pederaści'* (pederasts), etc. Qualitative analysis did not identify any distinct topics present in the negative content.

Key phrases identifying politician accounts

Key phrases identifying politicians were their X (formerly Twitter) account addresses, unique character strings that make up the address of the main page, or the 'handle'. Those handles appear in all mentions published on the account and in all shared posts and posts by other authors/authors tagging the account. The lists were compiled based on the accounts of the top two leaders on the electoral lists in each of the 13 registered electoral districts for the five key electoral blocs (which represent electoral committees) leading in the polls: Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Coalition (KO), Liberty and Independence Confederation (Confederation), Third Way (Szymon Hołownia's Poland 2050 and the Polish People's Party) and the New Left, as well as main accounts of parties and party leaders. These include candidate accounts created and available on X (formerly Twitter) until 9 June 2024.

Overall, the following accounts were tagged:

- Law and Justice (PiS) Electoral Committee – 26 accounts
- Civic Coalition (KO) Coalition Electoral Committee – 23 accounts
- Confederation Liberty and Independence (Confederation) Electoral Committee – 25 accounts
- Third Way Szymon Hołownia's Poland 2050 – Polish People's Party Coalition Electoral Committee (Szymon Hołownia's Poland 2050 and Polish People's Party) – 21 accounts
- The Left Coalition Electoral Committee (New Left) – 21 accounts

The procedure we used allowed us to identify comparable groups of accounts. To account for differences in the number of accounts and account activity (both owners and other users tagging accounts), all analyses comparing the various factions took into account the ratio of posts containing specific phrases to all posts relating to a particular political faction or coalition.

ACTIVITY:

Between April 15 and 23 June 2024, we observed 1,764,638 posts and mentions on selected accounts of politicians and political movements. Activity varied significantly from one bloc to another.

The most active accounts during the study period were those of the Civic Coalition (KO) and Law and Justice (PiS). The highest activity was seen in KO-related accounts, ranging from 4,555 to 83,494 mentions – an average of 12,919 individual mentions per day. Significantly lower activity was associated with PiS accounts – from 3,018 to 12,449 mentions, an average of 6,789 per day.

Chart 1. Average daily number of posts referring to particular electoral blocs (accounts) or published on observed accounts.





Chart 2. Daily variability of activity associated with each electoral bloc.

The data presented in Chart 2 indicate that the pre-election period of intensified online activity is primarily associated with the KO and PiS blocs, with a slight rise also seen for the Third Way. For other parties and electoral committees, an increase occurred only shortly before the election. However, the overall rise in online activity was minimal and short-lived. Meanwhile, activity relating to individual parties and blocs remained relatively stable throughout the study period. The data also show that these activity spikes did not begin well before the official start of the campaign, nor did they experience a sharp decline immediately following its conclusion. Additionally, the data reveal significant disparities in the activity of various coalitions and electoral committees.

Analysis – indicators

Corpus analysis involves counting selected keywords and phrases.

The expert judges method was used to identify post categories. The judges were tasked with flagging phrases and keywords classified as negative. In the case of Ukrainians, refugees and LGBT+ people, the thematic categories were relatively narrow and clear, so the keywords were assigned by the researchers.

For Jews and Israel, the concept mapping method³ (Jackson and Trochim, 2002⁴), was used to map the topic (in this approach, terms are sorted by independent judges, followed by multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis to define categories; 10 persons participated in the sorting exercise).

Limitations of web content research

Research on social media content presents a challenge due to a multitude of factors that can affect the quality and completeness of the data collected. Despite the expertise of the authors and the use of advanced analysis tools, several limitations should be considered.

Firstly, the sheer volume of available data means that not all of it can be thoroughly analysed. Additionally, the technological and perceptual limitations of analysis tools can affect the interpretation of the content under review. Determination of the context of statements and their complexity are also a source of difficulty.

Another challenge is posed by the specific nature of social media platforms, with dynamic changes in user-generated content. Content editing by users and content removal by the platform, restricting the visibility, may lead to inconsistent or incomplete data.

Varying user sensitivities to social media content must also be taken into consideration. What may seem neutral to one person could be offensive to another. As a result, existing linguistic corpora may not cover all potential contexts and interpretations.

Finally, the language of internet users, especially in the case of hateful content, evolves at an exceptionally rapid pace. This development is associated with certain trending words becoming temporary 'fads', as well as deliberate attempts to make hateful or criminal content more difficult to detect. Examples include intentional misspellings or substitute words, such as using '*rzymianie*' (Romans) or '*zymianie*' (Romans, but misspelled) instead of '*Żydzi*' (Jews).

Despite these challenges, the project and report team have made every effort to provide the most reliable and comprehensive analysis possible.

3. Concept mapping is a graphical data analysis technique where concepts or ideas are represented through a visual structure of nodes (concepts) and connections between them (relationships). The method is used to understand complex relationships between different elements or topics by organising and visualising them. Through concept mapping, researchers can better understand the structure, hierarchy, and interrelationships between different concepts, which facilitates data analysis, decision-making, and strategy development. Jackson K.M., Trochim W.M.K. (2002).

4. Jackson K.M., Trochim W.M.K., *Concept mapping as an alternative approach for the analysis of open-ended survey responses*, "Organizational Research Methods" 2002, vol. 5(4), <https://doi.org/10.1177/109442802237114>

STUDY RESULTS

NEGATIVE CONTENT: SCALE AND COMPARISON BETWEEN THE GROUPS.

As a first step, to estimate the scale of negative content targeted at each group covered by the study, we summarised all flagged posts from 15 April to 23 June 2024 – a total of 70 days. The results (displayed in Table 1) reveal a significant variability both between the targeted groups under observation and within each group. On average, the group most frequently mentioned in the threads were Ukrainians, followed by refugees, with Jews and LGBT+ individuals ranking third in frequency.


Table 1. Number of daily mentions per content type

Group	Average daily number of posts	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Ukrainians	41,355	7,932	24,391	68,399
Refugees	19,351	10,540	9,851	53,865
Jews	16,822	5,736	8,117	36,672
LGBT+ people	2,744	1,137	1,243	7,540

Given the large variations in keyword ranges described in the methodology, comparisons between the groups offer only a general sense of which groups, particularly exposed to hatred, attracted the most attention from X users, and therefore generated most mentions. Nevertheless, the difference in scope is very clear. The results presented here also show relatively high daily fluctuations across all monitored groups, though with noticeable differences. The most significant changes were observed in mentions of Ukrainians and refugees, while mentions of Jews and LGBT+ individuals are less variable. As anticipated, the highest volatility across all groups under observation was recorded when the election campaign was nearing the end.


The collected data enable a comparative overview of the tone of mentions about the targeted groups. To juxtapose such diverse data, we compared the proportions of posts containing negative keywords (in relation to all posts about each group).

Chart 3. Proportion of negative posts in relation to all mentions of each group.



The results show that posts referring to Jews and LGBT+ individuals were the most negative. For Jews, more than 67% of the content included negative keywords. Posts concerning LGBT+ individuals fared only slightly better, with nearly half carrying negative content. The proportion of negative keywords was lower for refugees, with just over 30% of negative content. Posts about Ukrainians had the lowest amount of negative content.

Chart 3a. Daily proportion of negative posts in relation to all mentions of each group.




ANALYSIS OF CHANGES

ANTISEMITIC CONTENT


NUMBER OF ANTISEMITIC MENTIONS

Chart 4. Number of mentions of Jews, including negative content.



The data presented in Chart 4 show all mentions of Jews and Israel, including all negative mentions.

Chart 5. Daily percentage of negative mentions of Jews and Israel (relative to all mentions of Jews and Israel).



The data presented in Charts 4 and 5 show that since the start of the election campaign on 25 May 2024, there has been a consistently elevated level of discourse and a steady number of antisemitic mentions, directly correlated with politically significant developments (as illustrated in the events table). In the data collection period, it is significant to note that the highest levels of activity were recorded even before the official announcement of the electoral lists on 15 April 2024. One of the most striking findings is that for virtually the entire data collection period, negative content was definitely dominant.

We also provide examples of mentions that appeared within time frames that impacted user engagement in these discussions. It is worth highlighting that the intensification of antisemitic mentions has continued since 7 October 2023, when Hamas terrorists launched an attack on Israeli citizens, after which the conflict escalated further. The politics of the State of Israel is a major theme in this content.

Table 2. Events shaping the discourse and examples of statements about Jews and Israel.

Date	Events	Examples of mentions ⁵ (original spelling, censored)
3.05.2024 A	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> S**s-of-b****es. That wanker with sideburns keeps saying that the Israeli army is the most humanitarian army in the world? @YacovLivne And Jews will be Jews. Sod off! Raus! Jewish wh**es murder as they go. Zionists can go f*ck themselves in the grave. ### R ### !!! 🇺🇸 🇮🇸 There are no bigger wh**es in the world than the Romans
8.05.2024 B	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In ukropolin, unfortunately, the Israeli option has been in rule since 1926. @ZelenskyyUa They are all so alike that you don't know who to look for 😞 fu****g kikes... Emil, get f*ck off and go to your goys with sideburns 🇺🇸 you scumbag, because you are goy to us, which is the same as pigs
12.05.2024 C	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Yids built themselves a ghetto to fence themselves off from the Poles. At a time when proud Muslims were helping Poles, Jews sold watches and Poles to the Nazis but they also died, hypocritical cu**s. Time to finish off Hitler's successors
18.05.2024 D	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> @BartSienkiewicz is a clown but it was @pisorgpl who was bad both of these formations are political pathology, corrupt yids and communists – I wonder what the drunk will say about them supporting 'upadlina'? What kind of shit is that, they should support them on their own if they are so fond of them what the f*ck is this kike talking about... How much longer will this Putinist c*nt, kike from Kremlin, paid RuSSian troll insult Poles? WSI bitch. A collaborator and szmalcownik, Bolshevik and Stalinist. The worst kind of Asian barbarians...
26.05.2024 E	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aaron Langman, the kike who sold half of Poland for the proverbial peanuts 🗨️ What the f*ck? Who the f*ck loves them?? Magdalena, you wh**e paid by the hour, how much do the Jews pay you for such insane bullshit?! What a bunch of bastards. Poor baby. Lousy yids
29.05.2024 F	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The German genocide was not limited to Jews. Auschwitz is not just about yids. People of all faiths died there, and there were yids among them. I think there should be either all religious symbols or none at all The yids will wipe one another out and call it antisemitism. 🇺🇸 F*ck the Jewish c**ts up the ass and in the eye
9.06.2024 G	EP election 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jewish c**ts @LukaszKohut @Arlukowicz @LeszekMiller @moanrosa @JanOlbrycht @MieczyslawKieca @MalgorzataPepek @NewsPlatforma @Platforma_org @RobertaMetsola @ZbigniewHoldys This fairy tale is all about the yids 😏😏😏😏 @YacovLivne Jude Raus, I think this phrase will soon come back to the European market, where fascist Jews feel more comfortable than at 'home' on stolen Palestinian land. Palestine don't give up, Poland was once there, too

5. Examples of content selected from so-called high-engagement accounts refer to posts that not only enjoy significant popularity but, most importantly, generate a high level of audience engagement. This means they are actively commented on, shared, and interacted with intensely and regularly. Such content has the ability to reach a large audience not only due to its popularity or the number of followers but primarily because of the genuine engagement and interactions it elicits from users. The original spelling has been preserved, while the content has been censored.

Number of antisemitic mentions (by content category)

Chart 6. Mentions of Jews and Israel by distinct topic




Chart 6 illustrates the number of mentions by separate topic categories, such as hateful content (hate speech), conspiracy theories, communism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, World War II, and competitive victimhood. The first significant change observed in the chart is a marked increase in content related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, World War II, and competitive victimhood between Poles and Jews from 4 May 2024 onward. This phenomenon can be linked to the increasing activity of internet users on topics discussing the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the spread of disinformation narratives such as ‘Jews rule the world’ and ‘ukropolin’.

When analysing these changes, special attention should be paid to the volume of hateful content, which remained consistently high throughout the study period. A noticeable surge in such content is particularly evident during the election campaign period, between the announcement of candidate lists and election day. Much of this content revolves around the ongoing conflict.

Additionally, there was a noteworthy rise in negative content four days before the electoral silence period, which was not directly linked to any specific political or historical event. The number of conspiracy theory-related mentions also rises, likely driven by posts speculating about Rafał Trzaskowski's potential presidential bid and rumours of a possible Silesian uprising following the Polish president's veto of the Silesian language law.

Narratives

During content analysis, we identified the most prevalent antisemitic narratives in user posts. A significant portion of the content was meant to disinform, polarise, and spread false information. We singled out such narratives as:

- Emphasising their foreignness (e.g., *It doesn't come as a surprise when three-quarters of the government are foreign avengers, like: Jews, Germans and Ukrainians, Poles have no say, because most of the population in Poland are foreigners, who settled in Poland after the second war and reproduced, but they still carry the genes of their country. Poor us Poles*).
 - Reinforcing the stereotype of a disloyal person who intends to damage the interests of Poland and Poles (e.g., *Multiculturalism is not an experiment but a deliberate action by Soros to destroy the European continent and the white man*).
 - Promoting conspiracy theories (e.g., *Jews rule the world and the most influential country, connect the dots 🚒🚒🚒*).
1. Being Jewish or of Jewish descent as an 'abstract negative symbol' and the greatest insult (original spelling, censored):
 - Insults (e.g., *I f*cking regret we can't get weapons in Poland as they do in the US – no Jewish and Banderite cu*t would ever make it to the Sejm and Senate*).
 - Discrediting (e.g., *Nonsense Duda – Jew – Aron Feigenbaum is talking! Shame on him as a president for Creating a Climate of Fear in Poland! A servant of the Khazar Jews! Khazars want to return to Kyiv. In 1158 they were all exiled from Kievan Rus for Usury! Duda supports Khazar Jews!*).
 - changing names as a way to give them a new meaning: Anna Maria Rzydowska, Morawietzki, Rau, Mazowiecki, Kuroń, Michnik.

2. Using the great replacement theory (original spelling, censored):

- Depopulation of Poland (e.g. *Success achieved: depopulation of 'ukry' and living space for 🇺🇦. The junkie will wipe these twats out for his own kind, garlic eaters with sideburns*).
- Holding the Jews responsible for the war in Ukraine and the resulting migration (e.g., *Well, it's just that the Jews caused the war to make money and rule Europe, business as usual*).
- Jews creating 'Heavenly Jerusalem' in Ukraine (e.g., *no one will deny that the land in Ukraine is owned by corporations and all this war is nothing but mass displacement of Ukrainian population to Western Europe .. Heavenly Jerusalem ..*).

3. Disinformation content (original spelling, censored)

- *Sir, it was not the Polish government that concealed or covered up the truth, but the Jews Khazars who rose to power in the Polish government by trickery. Your term is over, old farts, get out of my country, my homeland. GET OUT!!!!*
- *It's likely, because for a long time the Khazars have been considering this concept. Note that Israel is somehow strangely silent, and right after the beginning of the retaliatory Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Israeli authorities met with Putin...dill (unintelligible)*
- *what? And heavenly Jerusalem, and UKROPOLIN? Deniers have to connect the dots again*
- *Poles don't want that! Anyway, our country is not ruled by Poles but by JP Morgan, John Daniels, the KHAZAR MAFIA. I recommend checking out two projects: 'New California', 'Heavenly Jerusalem' Resettlement of Israel to Crimea Displacement of Ukraine to Poland. And so on.*
- *Israel will wind up the plandemic again. In 3 weeks they will put so many sticks in the nose that there will be an apocalypse of tests in hospital*
- *By the way I remind you that it is not the fault of the blacks that they are destroying Europe, they do it by nature, it is the fault of the international Jew that they are importing Africa to Europe by the million.*

- *This holocaust of the white race is organised by the Jews, who themselves are obsessed with the homogeneity of their Semitic race, so fanatical that they have practiced widespread incest for generations.*
- *Exactly 22 years ago, a group of Jews decided to sacrifice US citizens and the workers there for the sake of their business. And more than 70% of people still believe that the WTC was really hit by planes that fell apart..but the passports of the 'terrorists' miraculously survived.*
- *Has anyone heard of the 'Heavenly Jerusalem' project? Well, this project would involve the resettlement of Jews to Ukrainian land. It could be seen as a joke, but just take the current map of UKR and see where the hostilities are taking place. Interesting right?*
- *On 9 September 2007, Lech Kaczyński legalised the activities of a Jewish sect in Poland – the Hasidic Masonic Lodge B'nai B'rith, the Polin Lodge.*

Cross-cutting content

In our analysis of user-posted mentions on X, we paid particular attention to cross-cutting content with direct or indirect references to at least two of the groups under study. **Based on the qualitative analysis, it should be noted that hateful content is often based on multiple prejudices and reflects a broader 'hatred of all foreigners'.**

Examples of cross-cutting content (original spelling, censored):

- *The Jewish minions in this formation should be f*cking killed. I'll be praying so that next time the faggots in red berets will run into a group of soldiers who will shoot them up.*
- *Niggers as humans? A bold claim. So maybe Jews are also human?*
- *A broad kissing a guy's feet. What's so strange about that? She sees someone stronger than her, so naturally she bows and spreads her legs. I'm just waiting for the Polin wh***s to start kneeling before the Negro rocket 😊 Long live feminism ! Karma returns*
- *Łukasza and you are being steered by Globalists – Khazar Jews because all the shit that is going on in Europe and especially in Poland is on the Orders of Zionist Satanists! It is the Khazars who want to erase humanity and leave their Minions in the end!*
- *Don't share this wh**e lesbian ugly yid*

Word formation

We were particularly struck by the very rich vocabulary users employed to craft antisemitic mentions, setting this type of content apart from other hateful content under study, aimed at other minority groups.

The antisemitic content often incorporated not just familiar terms from antisemitic discourse but also newly coined variations, such as '7ydzi'. Deliberate misspelling is also employed, such as 'rzytów', 'ysrael' and 'rzydzi'. Words are also intentionally repurposed, such as the use of the word 'rzymianie' (Romans).

These practices are purposefully used to appeal to audiences familiar with these specific codes. It is also worth noting that these methods are used to evade detection by algorithms and content administrators searching for hateful or illegal content. Special attention should also be paid to the trend of assigning new meanings to words that had traditionally dominated the antisemitic discourse and broadening their scope, for instance by introducing such words as 'ukraiński parch' (Ukrainian yid), 'ukropolin' or 'pedalska onuca' (faggoty footwrap).

Negative content about Jews in the context of political parties

Chart 7. Proportion of posts relating to each political bloc with negative content about Jews and Israel.




Chart 7 illustrates the proportion of negative mentions of Jews in online posts in the context of each political party, broken down by election committees, in 2024.

Among the committees included in the analysis, there is a stark disparity in the proportion of antisemitic posts. Content related to Jews and Israel predominantly appears in Confederation accounts and, to a much lesser extent, in those of the Left. Notably, for the Confederation, on 4 May and 27 May, more than 50% of the mentions are also focused on Jews and Israel. Additionally, increased activity is clearly visible between the announcement of the electoral lists and the elections. However, when interpreting these results, it is important to consider the significant disproportion in the activity levels of the different blocs.

ANTI-REFUGEE AND ANTI-MUSLIM CONTENT

Number of anti-refugee mentions

Figure 8. Number of mentions of refugees, including negative content.





Chart 9. Daily percentage of negative mentions of refugees (relative to all mentions of refugees). The designations in the chart refer to the specific events indicated in Table 3.



Since the study began, content relating to refugees and migrants has surfaced in the public debate with varying degrees of intensity. During the election campaign under study, the issue of the refugee crisis within the EU and along Poland’s eastern border was a key topic. Interestingly, refugee-related content saw an uptick during the final phase of the election campaign. A marked increase can be observed from 13 May onwards, with mentions rising by 150% in the two days leading up to the election. However, it is also noteworthy that although mentions declined post-election, they did not return to pre-campaign levels, and just a week after the election, a significant increase in mentions can again be seen. When analysing negative content related to refugees and migration, the highest concentration of such content was recorded in the middle of the campaign (19 May), after which it quite steadily decreased for the remainder of the observation period.

Table 3. Events shaping the discourse and examples of anti-refugee statements.

Date	Events	Examples of mentions ⁶ (original spelling, censored)
8.05.2024 H	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>That's great. Apparently, there's not enough queers, lesbians, blacks and other lunatics.</i> • <i>@MSchreiberM Your hubby @LukaszSchreiber with the @pisorgpl gang has let in so many illegal migrants here that you're bound to fall for some wog. Marianna Abdul Wisimulacha [an invented ethnic slur surname]</i>
10.05.2024 I	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The refugee invaders will stop this madness...</i> • <i>WTF the f*cking wog,</i>
17.05.2024 J	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Don't worry about PDT's problems, you wog. You should worry about what you will be doing soon. Who would give a job to a slob like you. Unless, of course, you go to Belarus.</i> • <i>You'll be f*cked by an Islamist sexist you'll be paying for the breeding of other people's pagan brats you goy retard A Jew will never turn against a Jew because they have brains and you're a low IQ inferior race</i>
20.05.2024 K	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>I confirm I was the vacuum cleaner 🧹 Let these f*cking Muslims finish with us as soon as possible, because you can get brain cancer from this childish I'm a cool Pole bullshit</i> • <i>Well, I'm a sleeper and I'm in no f*cking hurry to go to Netherlands with its homos and wogs. Because this is Poland</i>
22.05.2024 L	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>This 17-year-old trans man probably enjoyed SADISTIC PLEASURE of dominance when this 14-year-old girl had to address him as 'here' at the court hearing. F*cking sick. In a little more than a decade, Europe will be either be fascist or Islamic. I guess there is no other option</i> • <i>Let even more immigrants come, let' f*ck up this continent even more</i>
26.05.2024 M	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Get the f*ck out of this union what else will they force on us to roll out rugs for Muslims to pray... f*ck the f*cking frog eaters they can shove their solidarity with this cattle up their asses</i> • <i>In our country I guarantee you that this mess with refugees even if it's allowed... it won't be long, the first rape of Polish women and a couple of people will be stabbed to death. Then burning them together with their 'facilities' and lynching in the streets. We will defend ourselves</i>
1.06.2024 N	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>And is she still a councillor? Because if so, it means that the citizens of Michałów are stupid and should be allowed cultural enrichment – I'm talking some rape, theft or murder.</i> • <i>These sick f*cks mean it. People who can't afford to emigrate will stay and they will 'adopt' them. It's the same as in Ukr..., they're preparing the ground for the Romans.</i>
3.06.2023 O	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>And negro, jew, f*ck Islam, kill them faggots</i> • <i>when you support refugee invaders Holland the yid is happy and says men should lose their voting rights. when you want to shoot refugee invaders, Holland the yid moos like a wounded ox. choose wisely. Oppress Holland the yid! Auslander RAUS</i>

6. Examples of content selected from so-called high-engagement accounts refer to posts that not only enjoy significant popularity but, most importantly, generate a high level of audience engagement. This means they are actively commented on, shared, and interacted with intensely and regularly. Such content has the ability to reach a large audience not only due to its popularity or the number of followers but primarily because of the genuine engagement and interactions it elicits from users. The original spelling has been preserved, while the content has been censored.

Chart 10: Mentions related to refugees and migration by distinct topic





Chart 10 illustrates the number of mentions extracted for the analysis of topics around which the published content was centred. From the beginning of the survey, there is a clear trend indicating that migration – particularly the issue of refugees in the context of the Polish-Belarusian border crisis – dominates the debate. As the discussion intensifies, both negative perceptions and hate speech are on the rise, and so are threads referring related to the ‘cash-for-visa scandal’.

The analysis shows that a neutral approach to the migration issue tends to prevail over a negative one, the latter often placing an emphasis on the dangers of migration. During periods of heightened election campaign activity, the distinct category of hate speech – negative and derogatory language used to describe refugees – tends to rise, as the topic of refugees becomes a key element of political discourse.

The events that were central in the refugee debate during the election campaign happened concurrently and had a compounding effect, intensifying the discussion.

Chart 11. shows the percentage of negative mentions of refugees in posts relating to political parties, broken down by all electoral committees. Similar to antisemitic content, anti-refugee narratives are marginal.



ANTI-UKRAINIAN CONTENT

Number of anti-Ukrainian mentions

Chart 12. Number of mentions of Ukrainians and Ukraine, including negative content





Chart 13. Daily percentage of negative mentions of Ukrainians (relative to all mentions of Ukrainians). The designations in the chart refer to the specific events indicated in Table 4.



The results reveal little user activity on topics related to Ukraine during the campaign itself. Unlike the 2023 parliamentary campaign (described in the report „Monitoring nienawistnych treści. Wybory parlamentarne 2023”⁷ (Monitoring of hateful content. Parliamentary elections 2023), Ukraine was not a major political theme in this campaign, and this did not change due to political crises or frontline news.

Table 4. Events shaping the discourse and examples of hateful statements about Ukrainians and Ukraine

Date	Events	Examples of mentions ⁸ (original spelling, censored)
10–12.05.2024 P	UN General Assembly in New York passed a resolution to strengthen Palestinian UN mandate ⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>I'm f*cking going to keep repeating this as long as it takes. Ukrainians in Poland are like negroes and pakis in Western Europe. F*cking animals</i> • <i>Ukraine gave no support. I'm not surprised they're too dependent on the US so genocide or not, their own ass counts the most.</i>
17–18.05.2024 R	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>TRZASKOWSKI is a SLOTH and a LOAFER. He is now waiting until the presidential ELECTIONS in 2025. Before that, he had the schools and the presidential ELECTIONS FINANCED by SOROS, the DISGUSTING JEW. In addition, SOROS finances his BATORY FOUNDATION, which sets the JEWISH-ORCHESTRATED JUDICIAL LAW for BODNAR the Ukrainian and for POLAN</i> • <i>Aren't you ashamed to be a dog of the Banderites?</i>
4–5.06.2024 S	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sure, it's better to raise taxes and distribute this bounty to Ukrainians, homos, or LGBT freaks.</i> • <i>🔫🔫🔫 get your gun and f*cking go defend your Banderite friends you 'moron'</i>

7. <https://czulent.pl/monitoring-nienawistnych-tresci-podczas-wyborow-parlamentarnych-2023/>

8. Examples of content selected from so-called high-engagement accounts refer to posts that not only enjoy significant popularity but, most importantly, generate a high level of audience engagement. This means they are actively commented on, shared, and interacted with intensely and regularly. Such content has the ability to reach a large audience not only due to its popularity or the number of followers but primarily because of the genuine engagement and interactions it elicits from users. The original spelling has been preserved, while the content has been censored.

9. <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/polska-poparla-rezolucje-zgromadzenia-ogolnego-onz-w-sprawie-zwiekszenia-uprawnien-palestyny-w-organizacji-narodow-zjednoczonych>

Chart 14. Topics of mentions of Ukraine and Ukrainians.




Chart 14 shows the number of mentions on the topics identified for the purposes of the study around which the published content was centred. An extremely interesting result is that references to difficult Polish-Ukrainian relations focused on World War II (Volhynia, the UPA, Bandera) dominate over contemporary topics such as the war going on in Ukraine. We observe a significant increase in mentions related to World War II and the Volhynia topic from 3 June 2024 until election day. This uptick is directly tied to the actions of Grzegorz Braun, who, on 4 June, removed the Ukrainian flag from a museum mast in Krakow¹⁰. It is worth noting that during the study period, there were no significant anniversaries, such as the anniversary of 'Bloody Sunday'¹¹ or the commemoration of the 81st anniversary of the Volhynia massacre¹² on 11–12 July 2024.

As with the other groups, we conducted an analysis of negative narratives about Ukraine and Ukrainians in the context of political parties.

10. <https://tvn24.pl/krakow/krakow-grzegorz-braun-sciagnal-z-masztu-kopca-kosciuszki-flage-ukrainy-sprawa-zajmie-sie-prokuratura-st7947190>


11. W 2016 roku Sejm ustanowił 11 lipca Narodowym Dniem Pamięci Ofiar Ludobójstwa dokonanego przez ukraińskich nacjonalistów na obywatelach II RP.

12. <https://samorzad.gov.pl/web/miasto-chelm/obchody-81-rocznicy-rzezi-wolynskiej>

ANTI-LGBT+ CONTENT

Number of anti-LGBT+ mentions

Chart 15. Number of mentions of LGBT+ individuals, including negative content.



Number of anti-LGBT+ mentions

The results show that midway through the campaign, there was a temporary but significant increase in mentions of LGBT+ people. However, despite the high variability in the percentage of negative content, it is difficult to discern any significant patterns or concurrence with specific events. Since the start of the study, anti-LGBT+ content has been present in online discourse. The largest spike in negative mentions occurred around the issue of the mayor of Warsaw signing an order¹³ to ban the display of religious symbols in public offices. An increase in negative mentions was also seen following news of planned Pride events and the Pride Month celebrated in June.

13. <https://www.rp.pl/samorzad/art40369211-krzyze-znikna-z-warszawskich-urzedow-trzaskowski-podpisal-zarzadzenie>

Chart 16. Daily percentage of negative mentions of LGBT+ people (relative to all mentions of LGBT+ individuals). The designations in the chart refer to the specific events indicated in Table 5.





Table 5. Events shaping the discourse and examples of anti-LGBT+ statements.

Date	Events	Examples of mentions ¹⁴ (original spelling, censored)
3.05.2024 T	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Faggot and wanker and in addition from Ukraine awesome draw</i>
6.05.2024 U	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>f*cking snoop at 8:00 pm? haha I guess I would have to be a f*cking faggot to fall for that</i> <i>This Jew and fag supports it.</i>
11.05.2024 V	Pride event in Łódź	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Homosexuality is a mental disorder, just like zoophilia and paedophilia</i> <i>In Września County, it is Nekielka – perhaps the most pro-Trzaskowski village in the area. In 2020, the whole village was f*cking plastered with rainbow Raphael's posters, and in the winter, unironically, people had Christmas lights shaped as lightnings as in the madwomen strike xD</i>
14.05.2024 W	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Why don't you appoint Wojewódzki as the country's chief paedophile and degenerate.</i> <i>Yes. That's why we're going to f*cking get rid of your orders of tolerance for deviants, so there will be no hatred. Don't provoke normal people. Imposing an ideology in an aggressive way is unacceptable so sod off with this lgbtq+ and other ridiculous mental disorders</i>
21–24.05.2024 X	Pride event in Tricity, election campaign	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>A secular state. A cross in the church. An emblem in the office. LGBT flags on psychiatric hospitals. That's how this post should read.</i> <i>Awwwww it's f*cking shit, it's no fun without the chief fags and wankers.. Let us know if you are going again.</i> <i>What a sleazy faggot, and a necrophile on top of that. You peasant, you should fly among your kind in the sewer and eat people's shit. I despise you, you midget, you fighter who got smacked in the face by Szczena the bum and bicycle thief.</i>
1–2.06.2024 Y	Pride event in Opole, Piaseczno and Lublin, election campaign	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>@KrystPawlowicz You don't have a husband or a child, so you're a leftie, a total lezzie. Unless you're a priest lover, then I forgive you as a Catholic Pole.</i> <i>rainbow/Russian footwraps are wailing</i>
7.06.2024 Z	Election campaign 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Why do extreme leftists always look like paedophiles.</i> <i>Get the f*ck out to Choroszcz, you tranny</i>

14. Examples of content selected from so-called high-engagement accounts refer to posts that not only enjoy significant popularity but, most importantly, generate a high level of audience engagement. This means they are actively commented on, shared, and interacted with intensely and regularly. Such content has the ability to reach a large audience not only due to its popularity or the number of followers but primarily because of the genuine engagement and interactions it elicits from users. The original spelling has been preserved, while the content has been censored.

Chart 17. Number of negative mentions (hateful and derogatory) against LGBT+ people.



Based on the qualitative analysis, we were unable to single out any prevailing topics. As a result, all keywords that referred to LGBT+ individuals in a contemptuous or hateful manner were grouped collectively under the category of hate speech. The most significant increase in negative content occurred between 13 and 19 May 2024, and was linked to discourse around the alleged paedophilia of trans people, Pride events, and the debate over the removal of religious symbols from public offices in Warsaw.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

As a result of the second phase of pilot monitoring, aimed at investigating the rise in online hateful content during the election campaign, several important observations were made.

The European Parliament campaign, which was part of a closely timed series of elections, ran during a holiday period and thus saw lower engagement from political parties and internet users alike. Despite this decreased engagement, there was already an uptick in hateful content before the campaign officially began, suggesting that the political and social climate remained polarised as a result of the previous Sejm and Senate elections of 9 October 2023.

With the formal start of the campaign, there was a steady rise in activity on online platforms and a continued upward trend in hateful content. Following the campaign's conclusion, this type of content saw a significant reduction.

The analysis of internet user behaviours during the monitoring period showed that the rise in hateful content spread across different groups, reflecting the dynamic and fluid nature of this phenomenon. It was observed that hateful content targeting one minority group often triggered similar hostility toward other minority groups. A particularly noteworthy aspect is the correlation between the increase in antisemitic content and the rise in anti-Ukrainian and anti-refugee content, suggesting a link between different forms of hatred in public discourse.

Qualitative analysis from the monitoring also revealed a significant amount of disinformation and abuse of known conspiracy theories aimed at deepening social polarisation as well as sparking and fuelling fears. Furthermore, we observed a substantial engagement of user accounts posting massive amounts of hateful content directed at specific minority groups, which was an important aspect of this phenomenon. We identified certain user accounts that dedicated most of their activity to generating negative mentions targeting all the groups under study and attempted to link these groups to societal issues such as rising unemployment, increasing housing prices, or restricted access to healthcare, which may suggest the intentional use of hate speech to incite fear and social unrest.

The nature of online hateful content is constantly evolving linguistically. New expressions emerge, while familiar words acquire new meanings when used in different contexts. The spelling of hateful phrases is often deliberately altered to evade detection by algorithms and online platform administrators. It is also important to highlight the use of terms previously dominant in certain discourses (such as antisemitic discourse) in new contexts (like anti-Ukrainian or anti-LGBT+ content). Notably, during the study periods, antisemitic content surpassed neutral content in the linguistic categories under review, demonstrating both the intensity and widespread nature of the phenomenon.

Furthermore, there was a significant amount of disinformation and language inciting to hatred and violence, which often met with no response from online platform administrators. Also relevant in the context of the qualitative analysis is the involvement of user accounts that publish and spread hateful content aimed at specific minority groups on a mass scale to provoke fear and feelings of insecurity among the group members.

The monitoring revealed that hateful content is constantly evolving linguistically and its rise is often linked to political and social developments which are leveraged during election campaigns. It is also important to note that despite its nature, much of this content remains accessible on online platforms, highlighting the urgent need for policy changes within these social networks and an increased emphasis on the removal of hateful content.

The analysis of the collected data also has significant policy implications. During the election campaign, the surge in hateful content was used by various formations to manipulate public opinion, inflame public sentiment, and bolster their political agendas. This is especially relevant because hateful content often appears in the context of specific political topics or social developments, potentially influencing election outcomes, public opinion, and the security of the Jewish community in Poland.

It should also be noted that hateful content was used to sway public opinion and spread false information, which, in turn, could have impacted public policies and decisions made by authorities and politicians in response to the needs of different social groups. As a result, it is essential to adopt stronger and more effective measures at both the political and social levels to counter this phenomenon, while safeguarding freedom of expression and human rights in the online space.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

“COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO COUNTER ANTISEMITIC HATE SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC SPACE”

The project, carried out by the Jewish Association Czulent, aims to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to counter antisemitic hate speech in the public space. The initiative stems from the need to raise awareness about the harms of hate speech motivated by antisemitism, to provide effective methods for addressing such behaviours, and to educate policymakers and local authorities about the dangers posed by hate speech.

The project strategy focuses on three key pillars:

Legal assistance – offering professional legal support throughout every stage of criminal proceedings, from reporting a crime to trial, in order to minimise procedural errors and provide support to victims.

Strategic litigation and educational activities – organising conferences, seminars, workshops, and promoting best practices in prosecuting hate crimes.

Advocacy and cooperation – engaging in advocacy work targeting politicians, local authorities, and the Jewish community, as well as offering a platform for sharing experiences with NGOs and legal professionals. The project is designed not only to counter antisemitism, but also to build a stronger, more informed, and safer community capable of effectively confronting hate speech.

JEWISH ASSOCIATION CZULENT

The Jewish Association Czulent is an independent, nonprofit organisation, both national and international in scope, primarily involved in advocacy work.

Our platform brings together professionals from the Jewish community in Poland and beyond. Our advocacy work encompasses political, social, and legal dimensions, and is carried out by implementing innovative educational solutions and building coalitions for openness, against antisemitism, racism, and discrimination. We collaborate with institutions, public administration, and dialogue organisations to shape public attitudes and contribute to changes in Polish legislation regarding tolerance and the fight against racism. Our partners include the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the American Jewish Committee Central Europe, and the National Democratic Institute.

Czulent undertakes comprehensive initiatives to counter antisemitism, which include analyses and reports on the phenomenon of antisemitism within the Visegrad Group countries, and is also involved in strategic litigation activities. We operate the zglosantysemityzm.pl platform, which facilitates the reporting of antisemitic incidents and crimes, and provides legal support to victims. Through international coalitions such as the European Network on Monitoring Antisemitism (ENMA), the Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism (CCOA), the European Network Countering Antisemitism Through Education (ENCATE), and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), we collect and promote best practices, and recommend solutions at the European level.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON PREJUDICE

The Centre for Research on Prejudice at the Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, is a university research unit dedicated to studying stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination – core issues in social and political psychology. It was established in 2007 in a symbolic location at the former SS quarters in the Warsaw Ghetto, with a mission not only to research prejudice but also to create effective methods to counter intergroup hostility and monitor the extent of prejudice in Poland.

LIST OF FIGURES

Chart 1. Average daily number of posts referring to particular electoral blocs (accounts) or published on observed accounts.

Chart 2. Daily variability of activity associated with each electoral bloc.

Chart 3. Percentage of negative posts in relation to all mentions of each group.

Chart 3a. Daily percentage of negative posts in relation to all mentions of each group.

Chart 4. Number of mentions of Jews, including negative content.

Chart 5. Daily percentage of negative mentions of Jews and Israel (relative to all mentions of Jews and Israel).

Chart 6. Mentions of Jews and Israel by distinct topic

Chart 7. Percentage of posts relating to each political bloc with negative content about Jews and Israel.

Chart 8. Number of mentions of refugees, including negative content.

Chart 9. Daily percentage of negative mentions of refugees (relative to all mentions of refugees).

Chart 10: Mentions related to refugees and migration by distinct topic.

Chart 11. Percentage of posts relating to each political bloc with negative content about refugees and migration.

Chart 12. Number of mentions of Ukrainians and Ukraine, including negative content.

Chart 13. Daily percentage of negative mentions of Ukrainians (relative to all refugee-related mentions)

Chart 14. Topics of mentions of Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Chart 15. Number of mentions of LGBT+ individuals, including negative content.

Chart 16. Daily percentage of negative mentions of LGBT+ people (relative to all mentions of LGBT+ individuals).

Chart 17. Number of negative mentions (hateful and derogatory) against LGBT+ people.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Number of daily mentions per content type.

Table 2. Events shaping the discourse and examples of hateful statements about Jews and Israel.

Table 3. Events shaping the discourse and examples of anti-refugee statements.

Table 4. Events shaping the discourse and examples of hateful statements about Ukrainians and Ukraine.

Table 5. Events shaping the discourse and examples of anti-LGBT+ statements.



stowarzyszenie
żydowskie
czulent



Centrum Badań
nad Uprzedzeniami



Foundation

ewz

Remembrance
Responsibility
Future



stowarzyszenie
żydowskie
czulent

www.czulent.pl

**JEWISH
ASSOCIATION
CZULENT**

**ul. Sebastiana 36/1
31-051 Kraków**