



# **Antisemitic incidents in 2024**

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# **Antisemitic incidents in 2024**

**Exploring the Jewish community experience**

[www.zglosantysemityzm.pl](http://www.zglosantysemityzm.pl)

**Krakow 2025**

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This report contains content that may be considered violent and uncensored. We recommend that vulnerable or younger people view the material with caution. Our aim is not to offend, but to educate and provide information.



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# 1. Introduction

The year 2024 was another period in which the phenomenon of antisemitism in Poland not only maintained its presence in the public space but also increased in strength, particularly in the context of international events. The data collected by the Jewish Association Czulent reveal a comprehensive picture of contemporary forms of hatred against the Jewish community, the nature, scale and manner of dissemination of which require both a diagnosis and a decisive institutional response.

Analysis through the monitoring and reporting system shows that the vast majority of incidents fall into the category of **offensive behaviour**, which includes insults, contemptuous comments, taunting and other forms of humiliation. In parallel, **acts of vandalism and destruction of property** were recorded, indicating the persistence of classic manifestations of antisemitism in the physical public space.

**Hate speech** was clearly dominant among the types of incidents, occurring both on its own and in conjunction with **antisemitic stereotypes and Holocaust denial**. The internet - especially social media - has become a significant channel for the distribution of hateful content, often based on false historical narratives and conspiracy myths.

This report contains data on hate crimes, antisemitic incidents and hate speech motivated by antisemitism reported to the Jewish Association Czulent in 2024 via the platform [www.zglosantysemityzm.pl](http://www.zglosantysemityzm.pl), as well as data from the organisation's internal internet monitoring. This monitoring was carried out by the association's experts, who used social listening tools and AI. Identified potentially hateful content, including, for example, comments on social media platforms, was individually assessed by trained team members. The analysed Polish-language content on the internet, including social networks, was of a public nature.

**This report does not present the full number of antisemitic incidents in Poland.** Due to the phenomenon of underreporting, which has been observed for years and repeatedly raised by, among others, the Commissioner for Human Rights<sup>1</sup>, the absolute scale of the problem remains partly invisible. This is a challenge that is not only faced by the police, but also by us as an organization supporting people experiencing discrimination and/or hate crime that we recognise in our daily work. Despite these limitations, thanks to a system based on cooperation with Jewish organisations and internet monitoring, as well as an adopted methodology based on double verification of reports, we can identify the key trends of antisemitism in Poland and the threats faced by members of the Jewish community.

The report is a **unique analysis in which the attendance of victims' needs is at the centre.** It is based on an analysis of qualitative and quantitative data and takes into account legal aspects and criminal law qualifications. Its main objective is to show the social mechanisms and forms of contemporary antisemitism in Poland and identify areas requiring action to counter this phenomenon.

This is the second annual report in which we publish thematic chapters in addition to information on **research findings and statistics.** These are devoted to online trends that we have observed as growing this year, such as **intersectional sexist attacks** on women identified as Jewish, **Holocaust denial and distortion**, the correlation of antisemitic incidents **with national and international events**, and a chapter on **presidential elections.**

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1 Failure to report bias-motivated crimes remains a serious challenge in the Polish reality, leading to fraction of the real scale of discrimination and violence against vulnerable groups. Despite existing legal regulations and growing public awareness, a significant proportion of such incidents still do not reach official registers or law enforcement agencies. According to the Ombudsman's Office, only about 5% of hate crimes are reported to the police (<https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/skala-przestepstw-motywowanych-uprzedzeniami-i-nienawiscia-w-Polsce-badania-rpo-i-odhir>) (Accessed 9.05.2025).

## 2. Methodology

### Overarching principles

In 2024, **1598** reports of antisemitic incidents were analysed. Of these, **105** did not pass verification<sup>2</sup>, resulting in **1493 confirmed cases** for this final report.

The data was obtained thanks to the **involvement of the Jewish community in Poland**, submissions made through the [www.zglosantysemityzm.pl](http://www.zglosantysemityzm.pl) platform, and **internet monitoring** carried out by a team of analysts. A **professional online content monitoring tool, SentiOne**<sup>3</sup>, was also used in the analysis process. At the same time, analysts independently searched for and verified content, including images and videos, obtained from open sources.

The monitoring covered **publicly available online sources**, including websites, social media, news sites, blogs, and discussion forums. All forms of expression, such as comments, posts, graphics, videos, and other materials published by internet users, were considered.

To classify and describe the incidents, **categories taken from the methodology of the British organisation Community Security Trust (CST)**<sup>4</sup> were used. These categories were **adapted to the Polish context** by experts of the Jewish Association Czulent in cooperation with the German or-

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2 The process of verifying incidents is carried out in accordance with the methodology of the Jewish Association Czulent, described in detail in this report. Consequently, some of the reports were not classified as antisemitic incidents due to the failure to meet certain analytical criteria.

3 SentiOne is a state-of-the-art internet and social media monitoring platform for analysing online opinions, trends and sentiment. Thanks to advanced artificial intelligence and natural language processing (NLP) algorithms, SentiOne allows you to track mentions of products or topics, quickly detect image crises and analyse user sentiment.

4 More at: <https://cst.org.uk/> (accessed 9.05.2025).



ganisation **Research and Information Centre for Antisemitism** (RIAS Berlin)<sup>5</sup>. Using a consistent and unified methodology allows for a more accurate tracking of trends in Poland and the comparison of data at the European level.

The report only covers incidents that occurred in 2024. The reported incidents were verified by the project team<sup>6</sup> in cooperation with the submitters, recorded, and classified according to the established categories. This made it possible to present a cross-sectional analysis of the forms, extent, and nature of contemporary antisemitism in Poland.

The report includes **quotations from publicly available material**. The original spelling has been retained, with some passages censored to protect personal information or to remove vulgarisms.

### **Methodology for classifying antisemitic incidents**

The primary criterion for recording antisemitic incidents in 2024 was the presence of **antisemitic stereotypes, superstitions and prejudices**, which formed an important part of the characteristics of the incident. The content analysis of individual incidents is based on the operational definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)<sup>7</sup>. This definition allows for a coherent and substantive classification of phenomena bearing the hallmarks of prejudice against people identified as Jews. The process of verifying each incident includes a factual analysis conducted by an expert research team that assesses the perpetrator's context, language and intention based on a consistent methodology. In ambiguous cases, team consultation is used, and reference is made to international standards, such as guidelines from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) or the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). As part of the vetting process, we also pay attention to incidents in which negative narratives about Israel may stem from antisemitic

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5 More at: <https://www.report-antisemitism.de/en/bundesverband-rias/> (accessed 9.05.2025).

6 For information on the team, please see the 'Biographies' section.

7 Definition adopted by Poland in 2016 as part of its membership in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism> (accessed 9.05.2025).

prejudice. In such cases, we use Nathan Sharansky's 3D test<sup>8</sup>, which helps to distinguish between legitimate criticism of Israeli government policies and antisemitism disguised under the guise of that criticism - by demonising, delegitimising and applying double standards to Israel.

For analytical purposes, incidents have been classified according to the type of incident, place of occurrence, form of expression and the status and social affiliation of the victims. Incidents occurring in digital space constitutes a special category, which have been singled out due to their scale, language specificity and difficulty in identifying perpetrators.

The legal basis for the qualification of incidents is the provisions of the **Polish Criminal Code**, in particular:

- **Article 256 of the Criminal Code** - prohibiting the propagation of totalitarian regimes and incitement to hatred on grounds of national, ethnic, racial, religious or irreligious affiliation,
- **Article 257 of the Criminal Code** - criminalising public insulting of persons and violation of their bodily integrity for the reasons enumerated in Article 256 of the Criminal Code.

The decisive element for an incident to be considered a bias-motivated offence is the **motivation of the perpetrator**, based on the victim's actual or perceived membership of a particular group.

Incidents were reported by affected individuals, but some were detected independently - through monitoring of the digital space and media. Due to low public trust and stigma, **the actual scale of the phenomenon is larger than the number of recorded cases.**

## Type of event

According to the categories below, antisemitic incidents that are not considered punishable under Polish law are also systematised and analysed. We distinguish six types of incidents based on the nature and severity of the event: **physical violence, assault, property damage, threat, and insulting behavior.**

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8 The 3D test of antisemitism is a set of criteria, formulated by Israeli politician Nathan Sharansky, to distinguish between criticism of Israel and that resulting from antisemitism. The three Ds stand for delegitimation, demonisation, and double standards, each of which, according to the test, indicates antisemitism.

We define **physical violence** as a physical attack or assault that may result in loss of life or serious bodily harm. **Assault** is a physical assault, but in a manner that is not life-threatening or does not result in serious bodily harm. The mere attempted physical assault also falls into this category. **Property damage** is defined as the intentional damaging or painting of Jewish property, including using anti-semitic symbols and covering with posters or stickers. It also includes graffiti, damage to commemorative plaques and physical memorials<sup>9</sup>, as well as Jewish or deemed Jewish institutions. A **threat** is defined as any explicit written or verbal statement containing the use of violence, directed at a person or institution. Any antisemitic statement against Jewish or Israeli persons or institutions<sup>10</sup>, as well as antisemitic insults or comments against other persons and institutions with antisemitic undertones, are considered **offensive behaviour**. This includes antisemitic statements made or disseminated on the internet. Finally, antisemitic correspondence addressed to a wider audience, referred to as **mass propaganda**, usually takes the form of mass mailing.

We also record gatherings with antisemitic content. This includes observing events and conducting their contextual analysis. If antisemitic content is detected in speeches, slogans, banners, or calls, the entire gathering is registered as an incident of offensive behaviour. If antisemitic attacks or threats are made during or on the fringes of such a meeting, these are recorded as separate antisemitic incidents.

## Addressees of antisemitic incidents

Our methodology distinguishes between **individuals and institutions** as targets of antisemitic incidents. According to the IHRA operational definition of antisemitism that we use, described in the following subsection, antisemitism can affect people who are perceived to be Jewish in addition to Jews. An antisemitic incident may affect several people at the same time. In the report, we accurately record the number of people affected by the incident.

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9 Memorials are physical or symbolic areas that play an important role in shaping collective memory and identity. They include cultural creations that influence individual and collective understandings of past, and the construction of individual and group identity.

10 Jewish institutions in the Diaspora refer to a variety of organisations, religious communities, cultural, social or educational activities that bring together the Jewish inhabitants of the countries concerned, usually other than Israel. These may include synagogues, cultural centres, schools, charities or research institutions related to Jewish culture, history or religion that operate beyond the borders of Israel. Israeli institutions in the Diaspora, on the other hand, are those that represent the interests of the State of Israel outside its borders. These include embassies, consulates, cultural organisations, educational institutions or charitable foundations that work to promote Israel's culture, history and policies in countries with Jewish diasporas.

However, there are incidents to which we do not attribute any direct victims - these are situations that affect a broader group of unidentified audiences - such as antisemitic graffiti, stickers, posters in public spaces or meetings of an antisemitic nature, as well as hate speech present on publicly accessible websites targeting the entire community.

## Forms of antisemitism

In terms of content, there are five forms of antisemitism.

1. **In the paradigm of the antisemitic otherness**, Jews are described as alien or as not belonging to a particular majority society or cultural circle.
2. **Anti-Judaism** (traditional antisemitism) - a dislike of Jews justified by prejudice and religious stereotypes, e.g. the deicide, holding Jews responsible for the death of Jesus.
3. **Modern antisemitism** - which refers to the 'group soul' stereotype, and which has in mind an alleged all-encompassing Jewish conspiracy and influence (on finance, the economy, the media, politics), secretive actions, a special bond between Jews that threatens the majority, the perpetuation of an alleged link to communism.
4. **Post-Shoah antisemitism** (secondary antisemitism) refers to the way the Holocaust is portrayed or described, e.g. when the number of Jewish victims of Nazism is questioned. The Jedwabne lie<sup>11</sup>, i.e. the denial of Polish responsibility for the murder of their Jewish neighbours, also falls into this category.
5. **Israel-related antisemitism** (anti-Zionism) encompasses those attitudes and statements that go beyond the bounds of legitimate criticism of state policy. According to the IHRA definition, criticism of Israel as such is not antisemitism, but denying its right to exist, applying double standards or holding all Jews responsible for the state's actions is. Many incidents combine various forms of antisemitic content, including those related to the situation in the Middle East.

Often, an incident contains various expressions of antisemitism. Because of these multiple attributions, the number of forms is usually greater than the number of antisemitic incidents.

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<sup>11</sup> "Jedwabne lie" is a term referring to the controversies and disputes surrounding the interpretation of the crime committed in July 1941 in the village of Jedwabne in the Podlasie region, where a mass murder of Jewish inhabitants took place. The term is used primarily by circles and individuals who question historical findings that point to the complicity of some Polish inhabitants in this crime and to the role of the Germans as perpetrators and inspirers.

## Glossary

The Jewish Association Czulent has adopted a working definition of antisemitism<sup>12</sup>, denial<sup>13</sup> and distortion of historical truth about the Holocaust following the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) guidelines. In addition, the association refers to the definitions of antisemitic hate crimes developed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.<sup>14</sup>

**Antisemitism** is a certain perception of Jews that can express itself as hatred of them. Antisemitism manifests itself in both words and deeds directed against Jews or non-Jews and their property, as well as against the religious institutions and facilities of the Jewish community.<sup>15</sup>

**Antisemitic incident** - any incident that has elements of resentment, violence, discrimination based on the perpetrator's antisemitic motivation.

**Offence motivated by antisemitic prejudice** - there is no definition of a hate crime in the Polish criminal law system. However, this concept has been defined by the ODIHR-OSCE (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe). According to this definition, "Hate crimes are criminal acts motivated by bias or prejudice towards particular groups of people. All hate crimes have two distinct elements: (1) they are acts that constitute an offence under criminal law, and (2) in committing the crime, the perpetrator acts on the basis of prejudice or bias."<sup>16</sup>

**Hate speech** - "Hate speech is, in particular, statements propagating, promoting, or inciting, in any form, slander or hatred towards a person or group of people, as well as any harassment, insult,

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12 More at: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism> (accessed 9.05.2025).

13 More at: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion> (accessed 9.05.2025).

14 More at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/> (accessed 9.05.2025).

15 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. More On the definition, see our publication: P. Kwapisiewicz, A. Zielińska, Definition of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. A study., Jewish Association Czulent 2021, <https://czulent.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/definicja-antysemityzmu-ihra-omowienie.pdf>. (accessed 9.05.2025).

16 Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide. OSCE/ODIHR 2018, p. 5, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/317166> (accessed 9.05.2025).

negative stereotyping, stigmatisation or threats about such a person or groups of people and justifying all previous types of statements based on 'race', colour, origin, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation and other personal characteristics or status."<sup>17</sup> There is no definition of hate speech in the Polish criminal law system.

**Holocaust Denial and Distortion** - Holocaust denial is discourse and propaganda that deny the historical reality and the extent of the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis and their accomplices during World War II, known as the Holocaust or the Shoah. Holocaust denial refers specifically to any attempt to claim that the Holocaust/Shoah did not take place. Holocaust denial may include publicly denying or calling into doubt the use of principal mechanisms of destruction (such as gas chambers, mass shooting, starvation and torture) or the intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people. Holocaust denial in its various forms is an expression of antisemitism. The attempt to deny the genocide of the Jews is an effort to exonerate National Socialism and antisemitism from guilt or responsibility in the genocide of the Jewish people. Forms of Holocaust denial also include blaming the Jews for either exaggerating or creating the Shoah for political or financial gain as if the Shoah itself was the result of a conspiracy plotted by the Jews. In this, the goal is to make the Jews culpable and antisemitism once again legitimate. The goals of Holocaust denial are often the rehabilitation of an explicit antisemitism and the promotion of political ideologies and conditions suitable for the advent of the very type of event it denies<sup>18</sup>.

Distortion of the Holocaust refers, inter alia, to:

- Intentional efforts to excuse or minimize the impact of the Holocaust or its principal elements, including collaborators and allies of Nazi Germany;
- Gross minimization of the number of victims of the Holocaust in contradiction to reliable sources;
- Attempts to blame the Jews for causing their genocide;

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17 There is no single and universally accepted definition of hate speech. We base our assessments on definition of the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on combating hate speech (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 May 2022 at the 132nd Session of the Committee of Ministers) - CM/Rec(2022)16 <https://www.coe.int/en/web/combating-hate-speech/recommendation-on-combating-hate-speech> (accessed 9.05.2025)..

18 Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-holocaust-denial-distortion> (accessed 9.05.2025).

- Statements that cast the Holocaust as a positive historical event. Those statements are not Holocaust denial but are closely connected to it as a radical form of antisemitism. They may suggest that the Holocaust did not go far enough in accomplishing its goal of “the Final Solution of the Jewish Question”;
- Attempts to blur the responsibility for the establishment of concentration and death camps devised and operated by Nazi Germany by putting blame on other nations or ethnic groups.

### 3. Summary of antisemitic incidents in 2024

In 2024, we documented a total of **1,493 antisemitic incidents in Poland, including 2 cases of attacks, 14 threats, and 29 cases of damage to Jewish property and memorials.** In addition, we registered **40 cases of mass propaganda<sup>19</sup> and 1,415 instances of abusive behaviour<sup>20</sup>.** There is a prevalence of abusive behaviour in the online space - as many as **1,345 incidents took the form of abusive behaviour**, the vast majority of which involved online speech, mainly on social media.

#### Summary of the number of incidents:

- Total number of incidents: **1,493**
- Number of records sent to [www.zglosantysemityzm.pl](http://www.zglosantysemityzm.pl): **70**
- Number of records from internal monitoring: **1,423**

Each documented incident can be characterised by at least one of the forms of antisemitism. One of the most common forms is **modern antisemitism**, referring to the attribution to Jews of a special position, influence, political or economic, which occurred in **48% of incidents**. This form can be seen, inter alia, in statements aimed at insulting well-known persons of Jewish origin, in criticism of the Polish government, and in the spreading of any type of conspiracy myths. Among the incidents categorised as modern antisemitism, the most frequent forms of expression are: “Soros” - as a symbol of Jewish power or finance, and “Ukropolin” - one of the significant examples of a conspiracy narrative suggesting an alleged plan to “take over Poland” by Jews and Ukrainians. Such phenomena exemplify intersectional antisemitic and anti-Ukrainian hate speech and were recorded in 110 cases.

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19 Mass propaganda is a deliberate, systematic activity aimed at shaping specific views, attitudes and behaviour of large groups of people with mass media such as radio, television, press or the internet.


20 Of which 1,410 took place online, 1,325 incidents took place on social media. Here is the breakdown of incidents of abusive behaviour online on social media by platform: Twitter (X) - 1,180, Facebook - 88, TikTok - 24, Telegram - 16, Instagram - 7, YouTube - 4





**Figure 1.** Social media post containing conspiracy myths as an example of modern antisemitism. Comment published on the X platform, screenshot from 24.04.2024.

**Post translation:** *You f\*\* wh\*\*, Soros and Rothschild's b\*\*\*\* — you can kiss Dugin's a\*\* if he agrees. F\*\*\* you, you anti-Polish traitor, Jewish lackey.*



**Figure 2.** Comment published on the X platform, screenshot from 12.03.2024.

**Post translation:** *The thing is, Andrzej Duda's homeland is Ukropolin. And as for Tusk — well, everyone knows where his "homeland" is.*

We also noted numerous **instances of sexist content - 310 incidents** included this element of discrimination, representing **20.1% of hate speech incidents**. A specific form of symbolic violence against women was evident in the analysis of the incident descriptions<sup>21</sup>. Sexist-antisemitic statements included vulgarisms, insults and dehumanising language, especially towards women who are active in public.


In 2024, most victims of antisemitism were men - in incidents where we were able to identify the gender of the victim, there were **299 men**. However, massive hate campaigns are more often directed against **women**, of whom we identified **91** as the victims in 2024. The man against whom we observe such campaigns every year is Volodymyr Zelensky.

<sup>21</sup> Symbolic violence against women is a subtle but deeply rooted form of violence, involving the imposition of specific cultural and social norms on women that perpetuate their subordinate position in society. It operates through cultural messages, language, education and the media, often without physical violence, and its effects are difficult to see as victims are often unaware of its existence. More at: [https://kongreskobiet.pl/przemoc-symboliczna-wo-bec-kobiet/?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://kongreskobiet.pl/przemoc-symboliczna-wo-bec-kobiet/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) (accessed 9.05.2025).


## 4. Visualising the scale and dynamics of antisemitic incidents

### Types of incidents

Understanding the scale, nature and context of antisemitic incidents requires not only descriptive analysis, but also clear and transparent data presentation. This chapter presents a summary of key indicators and identified phenomena using graphs, tables and infographics. The graphical form makes it easier to grasp dominant trends, enables quick comparison of categories and allows both the scale of symbolic violence and instances of physical acts of hatred to be highlighted. The data presented is taken from the incidents collected in 2024 and has been grouped according to the typology adopted in this report.



**Chart 1:** Percentage and number of incidents by location of occurrence.




**Chart 2:** Comparison of online and offline incidents from 2022 to 2024.<sup>22</sup>

Type of event	Number of incidents		
Year	2024	2023	2022
Physical attack	2	4	2
Verbal attack	18	58	20
Destruction of property	31	35	32
Holocaust denial and distortion	91	73	34
Hate speech	1331	654	293
Other - does not meet the methodological criteria	252	199	133
Not applicable	10	6	6

**Table 1.** The initial classification of incidents is based on the categories selected by users when submitting a report through the platform.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Reports of offline incidents remain stable. However, the increase in online incidents does not fully reflect the scale of online antisemitism. Our analysis shows that after 7 October 2023, antisemitic hate speech increased by as much as 1059% (between 6 and 8 October 2023). Although the level is no longer as extreme, it has not returned to its pre-event baseline, indicating a continued and concerning escalation of the problem.

<sup>23</sup> Each reported incident is reviewed by an expert team.



The next step in analysing each incident is to verify whether the incident can qualify as a violation of the Polish Criminal Code. For this purpose, an expert team of lawyers and specialists in countering hate speech assigns the relevant legal qualifications. The chart below summarises the criminal law provisions found to have been violated by the incidents reported in 2024. As in previous years, in antisemitic incidents reported to us, the most frequent violations were of Articles 256 and 257 of the Criminal Code.<sup>24</sup>

24 **Article 256 of the Criminal Code.** [Propagation of Nazism, communism, fascism or any other totalitarian regime].

§1. Whoever publicly propagates a Nazi, communist, fascist or other totalitarian state system or incites to hatred on grounds of national, ethnic, racial, religious differences or on grounds of irreligiousness shall be subject to the penalty of imprisonment for up to 3 years.

§1a. The same penalty shall be imposed on anyone who publicly propagates Nazi, communist, fascist ideology or ideology inciting the use of violence to influence political or social life.

§2. The penalty specified in §1 shall be imposed on anyone who, for the purpose of dissemination, produces, perpetuates or imports, acquires, disposes of, offers, stores, possesses, presents, transports or transmits a print, recording or other object which contains the content specified in §1 or 1a or which is a carrier of Nazi, communist, fascist or other totalitarian symbolism used in a manner intended to propagate the content specified in §1 or 1a.

§3. The perpetrator of a criminal act specified in §2 shall not commit an offence if he or she has committed the act in the course of an artistic, educational, collecting or scientific activity.

§4. If convicted of the offence specified in §2, the court shall order the forfeiture of the objects referred to in §2, even if they are not the property of the offender.


It is worth noting that incidents that were criminal offences often violated more than one of the provisions of the Criminal Code.

Legal qualification	Number of incidents	Percentage of total (%)
Art. 257 Criminal Code (CC)	733	49,10%
CC Art. 256	442	29,61%
not applicable	419	28,07%
CC Art. 216 §2	179	11,99%
CC Art. 126a	42	2,81%
CC Art. 226 §3	28	1,88%
IPN Art. 55	15	1,01%
CC Art. 119	7	0,47%
CC Art. 261	7	0,47%
CC Art. 255	5	0,34%
CC Art. 288 §1	5	0,34%
CC Art. 196	4	0,27%
CC Art. 190 §1	3	0,20%

**Table 2.** Criminal law provisions violated in antisemitic incidents reported to us in 2024.

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**Article 257 of the Criminal Code.** [Assault on grounds of xenophobia, racism or religious intolerance]. Whoever publicly insults a group of people or an individual because of his or her national, ethnic, racial or religious affiliation or because of his or her irreligiousness, or for such reasons violates the physical integrity of another person, shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years. (Act of 6 June 1997 Criminal Code, Journal of Laws 1997 no. 88 item 553).



**Chart 4:** Number of incidents by legal qualification.

## Forms of antisemitism

The assessment of the antisemitic nature of the reported incidents is based on the operational definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). However, the phenomenon's complexity makes an in-depth analysis of its manifestations necessary. Therefore, the next step will outline the forms in which antisemitism can manifest itself. In doing so, it should be noted that a single incident may contain elements corresponding to different types of antisemitic motivation.

Based on the data contained in the reports of antisemitic incidents in Poland in 2024, one can observe a clear dominance of **modern antisemitism**, the most common form of which is **hate speech in the digital space**. Among the reported content, messages concerning the State of Israel and the conflict in the Middle East dominate. While superficially they may give the impression of mere criticism of state policy, they often contain elements beyond acceptable political discourse. They feature double standards, demonising language and motifs characteristic of traditional antisemitism

- such as references to the blood label, the portrayal of Jews as bogeymen, narratives of a 'Jewish conspiracy' or accusations of domination in the media, politics and the economy. These contents often use the language of dehumanisation and demonisation, which gives them an unambiguously antisemitic character. Comparisons of Israel's actions to Nazi Germany, which not only falsify historical reality but also constitute a form of denial, relativisation or distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, are also a frequent element of such messages. In the literature on the subject, this phenomenon is referred to as contemporary antisemitism, which combines traditional prejudices with new forms of hostility embedded in the context of current political events.

The literature also draws comparisons between the kind of antisemitism observed after 7 October and that experienced by Polish Jews during the March events in 1968. Anna Zawadzka points out that although violence against Jews in both periods took different forms, their common element was the **legitimisation of antisemitism by the dominant moral and political discourses**.<sup>25</sup> In both periods, anti-Zionism functioned as a socially acceptable mask for anti-Jewish prejudice: in 1968 in Poland, it led to institutional cleansing and emigration, and after 7 October 2023, it led to a wave of discursive violence, fuelled by the global narrative of 'Israeli colonialism'. Zawadzka notes that it is **only through temporal distance that the antisemitic nature of these phenomena can be recognised**. Contemporary anti-Zionism, like antisemitism in 1968, operates not through open hatred, but through the moral self-confidence of its supporters, who see themselves as defenders of justice without recognising their own bias.<sup>26</sup>

A significant number of entries contained **denialist language and forms of distortion of the Holocaust**, indicating a deepening problem of relativisation of perpetrators' guilt and reversal of historical responsibility. Significantly, many of the antisemitic entries were **pseudo-intellectual**, mimicking political or historical 'discussion', but based on manipulations of facts and hate language. This shows that contemporary antisemitism in Poland is increasingly occurring in a veiled, modern form, but at the same time, is firmly rooted in traditional forms of prejudice, which requires further education, tracking of trends and a systemic response both legally and socially.

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25 A. Zawadzka, Time and Field of Vision: Beginnings of a Comparative Perspective to Anti-Zionism in 1967-1968 and 2023-2024, Adeptus No. 21/2024, <https://journals.ispan.edu.pl/index.php/adeptus/article/view/a.3348/8653> (accessed 9.05.2024).

26 Ibid.

Type of antisemitism	Number of incidents	Percentage of total (%)*
Modern antisemitism	982	65,77%
Paradigm of otherness	451	30,21%
Antisemitism linked to Israel	373	24,98%
Post-Shoa-antisemitism	115	7,71%
Anti-Judaism	51	3,42%

\*Note: The sum of the percentages exceeds 100% because one incident could be classified under more than one type of antisemitism.

**Table 3:** Percentage of different types of antisemitism in reported incidents in 2024.

### Geographical distribution of antisemitic incidents

As in previous years, the most offline incidents in 2024 were reported in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. Thirty incidents were reported here out of the 79 that entered our database. This represents 37.97% of incident reports in the physical space, of which 25 incidents occurred in Warsaw. Malopolska Voivodeship is in second place with 28 incidents, of which 26 took place in Kraków.

The presented geographical data do not mean that these voivodeships or cities are where antisemitic acts occur most frequently, nor that they are particularly prone to antisemitism. Rather, they reflect the activity and engagement of local Jewish communities in documenting and reporting incidents. These areas are home to some of the largest and most active Jewish communities in Poland, which results in a higher number of reported cases.



Province	Number of incidents
mazowieckie	30
małopolskie	28
wielkopolskie	5
lubelskie	4
podkarpackie	3
łódzkie	2
warmińsko-mazurskie	2
podlaskie	2
dolnośląskie	1
pomorskie	1
zachodniopomorskie	1

**Table 4:** Local distribution of reported offline incidents by province.

## 5. Examples of antisemitic incidents


The following examples of incidents have been selected from the reports received in 2024 via the [zglosantysemitizm.pl](https://zglosantysemitizm.pl) platform to present the broadest possible spectrum of antisemitic phenomena. The incidents have been organised according to the adopted categorisation methodology and include both hate crimes subject to criminal liability under the provisions of the Criminal Code, as well as antisemitic incidents and manifestations of hate speech which, although not criminalised, clearly reflect the antisemitic attitudes of their perpetrators.

### Attack

- On the night of 1 May 2024, an unknown perpetrator launched an attack on the Nożyk Synagogue in Warsaw, throwing three Molotov cocktails - improvised incendiary bombs made of glass bottles filled with a flammable substance - towards the building from the side of the adjacent city park. The charges were thrown from behind the fence, towards the windows of the synagogue.
- The affected person was walking down the street and noticed a man walking behind her. At some point, the man hooked her leg, which was initially perceived as accidental. Then, while passing the affected person, he struck that person twice with his arm. The aggressor pointed to the Israeli flag patch on the injured person's backpack and asked if that person was from Israel. After denying it, the perpetrator immediately launched a verbal attack, accusing the injured person of 'infanticide'. When the affected person tried to respond with a question, the aggressor repeated the accusation, this time in English. After trying to end the confrontation firmly, the man threatened physical violence, declaring that he was stronger and could use force.

## Threat

- An unknown offender, with two dogs, entered the memorial from the unfenced part of the cemetery. In response to a remark to the inappropriate behaviour of bringing animals into the necropolis, the individual reacted immediately and aggressively. He threatened with physical violence, including “I’ll knock all your teeth out”, “I’ll fix you up so you won’t be here anymore” and “This is your last Sunday”.
- Platform X, quoting: “F\*ck you Jews. Holocaust 2.0 imminent, rest assured.”



**Figure 3:** Example of an online antisemitic threat. Comment published on the X platform, screenshot from 31.12.2024.

## Destruction of property

- The destruction of a plaque unveiled a month earlier to commemorate the ghetto building in Gdansk.



**Figure 4.** A vandalized plaque commemorating the Ghetto in Gdańsk. Source: <https://www.trojmiasto.pl/wiadomosci/Zniszczono-tablice-upamietniajaca-getto-w-Gdansk-n185172.html> (accessed 9.05.2025).

- A sticker with antisemitic content has appeared in Zabłocie, Kraków, on Slusarska Street. It depicts a crossed-out yellow Star of David and the inscription: “Nationalists and Arabs don’t kneel before Jews”.



**Figure 5.** Sticker on a pole.  
Submitted to  
[zglosantysemityzm.pl](mailto:zglosantysemityzm.pl).

- Graffiti with swastikas appeared on the entrance to the garage at 102 Chełmońskiego Street in Kraków. The symbols were quickly painted over and removed.



**Figure 6.** A photo of a graffiti by the garage sent to  
[zglosantysemityzm.pl](mailto:zglosantysemityzm.pl).

## Abusive behaviour

- After finishing their visit to the synagogue, a group of students stopped near it. At that moment, from one of the neighbouring residential buildings, an unknown perpetrator, using a megaphone, began shouting slogans in their direction: “Free Palestine. Get out. Get the f\*\*\* out”. The incident was reported to the relevant services. Despite the measures taken, the perpetrator could not be identified.
- While in Warsaw, a visitor to the city asked the public transport driver about the Jewish community’s presence in the city. In response, the driver answered: “All the Jews have gone to Gaza to murder Palestinians”.
- On 1 July, the Kinoteka - Palace of Culture and Science (PKiN) hosted a screening of a film about the Nova Festival, featuring a survivor of the terrorist attack that took place on 7 October 2023. The film screening was disrupted by young people protesting Israel’s actions in Gaza. The perpetrators also raised antisemitic shouts: ‘Only pigs sit in a cinema’<sup>27</sup> and ‘F\*ck you, f\*ck Israel’.
- In Szczecin, a sticker on a street sign read ‘#Stop the animal Holocaust’.



**Figure 7.** Sticker on a pole. Submitted to [zglosantysemityzm.pl](mailto:zglosantysemityzm.pl)

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<sup>27</sup> The slogan originated in German-occupied Warsaw during World War II. This controversial phrase became a symbol of resistance against the Nazi occupiers. It emerged as a response to the propaganda films shown in cinemas by the Nazis, which were intended to demoralize and intimidate the Polish population.



- Platform X quote: “It’s time to throw off these Jewish shackles and throw Kikes out from home, the commies could do it in ‘68, so can we. WE CAN! How much can we tolerate a parasite in our house”.
- A review titled ‘Genocide cuisine, not recommended’ appeared on the Google profile of a Jewish restaurant. At the restaurant’s request, Google removed the post.
- Platform X, quoting: “This is a planned genocide. The disciplined white race has been inoculated with poison and in its place in the US and Europe, the Jews are importing blacks”.
- During an occupation protest organised by a group of Jagiellonian University students affiliated to the ‘Academy for Palestine’ initiative, a slogan reading: “Gas the Jews”. This inscription was placed in the immediate vicinity of posters expressing solidarity with the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.



**Figure 8.** The fence of one of the buildings of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Photo published on Facebook by the Jewish Religious Community in Kraków. Screenshot from 16.10.2024.



**Figure 9.** An example of extreme antisemitic hate speech based on dehumanization and stereotypes. Comment posted on X; screenshot from 15.12.2024.

**Post translation:** „K\*kes aren’t human.”

\*The original Polish slur „parchy” is untranslatable; it has been replaced here with a similarly offensive English term to convey the meaning of the text.

- Platform X, quote: “Without going into the article, I know that it’s Jews. Jedwabne is a fuel for them to extort money and tenements from Poles”.
- “Shame on the Jews forever for murdering the children of Palestine. Viper tribe vile and greedy nation” - a comment on a Facebook post by [missionary.co.uk](https://www.missionary.co.uk), which published a photo of Chief Rabbi of Poland Michael Schudrich along with a quote from him about Pope John Paul II: “A man who respects John Paul II cannot be an antisemite”.
- On the Facebook profile of the Jewish Association Czulent, under a post stating: “Article 126a CC. One of the most frequently violated provisions of Polish law in incidents reported to us in 2023”, a user gave an antisemitic comment: “And do you also accept reports of incidents of the bombing of a humanitarian convoy?”<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> The comment was directed against a Jewish association whose activities had no connection to Israeli policy. In doing so, it assigns collective responsibility to the entire Jewish community for the actions of the State of Israel. According to the working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), this is an example of antisemitism, because—as the definition states—“holding Jews collectively respon-



**Figure 10.** An example of so-called “stadium antisemitism” in the form of a slogan printed on a sweatshirt available for sale online. Screenshot from 1.12.2024.

**Translation of the inscription:** around the outside of the circle: “Death to Cracovia”; across the diagonal: “Anti Jude.”



**Figure 11.** An example of so-called “stadium antisemitism” in the form of graffiti. Submitted to [zglosantysemityzm.pl](mailto:zglosantysemityzm.pl).

**Translation of the graffiti:** “J\*\*BAĆ ŻYDA” “Fuck the Jew” — used here as a call to kill the Jew.



## **Mass propaganda**

Based on the reports classified as mass propaganda, it is evident that in 2024, such incidents frequently involved **mass emails containing antisemitic content**. These messages included conspiracy myths, collective accusations against the Jewish community, and dehumanising language. These cases have in common their **organised, repetitive nature**, which distinguishes them from individual acts of hate speech. This type of propaganda aims to **spread prejudice on a large scale**, often using electronic channels, which makes it challenging to identify the perpetrators and limits the effectiveness of the legal response.

## 6. The particular vulnerability of women identified as Jewish

As mentioned in earlier chapters, in 2024 there were **91 incidents directed against women** that included gender-based hate speech. The analysed cases of sexist speech combined with antisemitism reveal the complex nature of prejudice, which rarely occurs in isolation. Women become targets not only because of their gender, but also because of their **ascribed or actual Jewish identity, political affiliation or public activism**. Insults such as 'Kike', 'hag' or 'dead Jewess' are at the same time expressions of **misogyny and antisemitism**, and their brutality often takes the form of symbolic violence that dehumanises the victim - stripping her of her subjectivity and humanity.


The vulgarity 'k\*\*\*a' – offensive name for a sex worker - often aimed at women of Jewish origin or perceived to be Jewish, acts as both a sexist insult and becomes a tool of **exclusion from public debate**. An analysis of cases in which the victim was a woman, and the word appeared in the description of the incident clearly highlights the **mechanism of intersectional linguistic oppression**. Examples such as: "Shut the f\*\*\* up b\*ch, you have no right to talk about the Holocaust" or "Maria the Jewish w\*\*\*e is making a victim of herself", point to a strategy in which a woman speaking in public is discredited as **promiscuous, deceitful and not entitled to speak**. According to Judith Butler's concepts<sup>29</sup> this kind of verbal violence not only hurts, but also constructs social boundaries of who has the right to speak and be heard.

These attacks particularly often target **publicly active women** - journalists, politicians, artists, who become the target of **sexualised insults, dehumanising comparisons and threats of physical violence**. This type of language has a disciplinary and repressive effect, attempting to push

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
29 J. Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*, New York - London: Psychology Press, 1997, [https://books.google.pl/books?id=I7D\\_AC\\_aKEMC&redir\\_esc=y](https://books.google.pl/books?id=I7D_AC_aKEMC&redir_esc=y) (accessed 9.05.2025).

women out of the space of public debate<sup>30</sup> and delegitimise their voice as allegedly ‘hysterical’ or ‘anti-Polish’. These cases clearly show that sexism is not merely an adjunct to antisemitism but often reinforces its violent character, serving as its vehicle and catalyst. What we have here is an intersectional violence in which different forms of discrimination - gender, ethnic, religious and ideological - **overlap to create a particularly toxic and dangerous message.**



**Post translation:** *Yeah, for sure, b\*\*ches like you should be killed, because it's unbelievable that such a w\*\*\*e can walk on this earth — a f\*ing Jewess.*

**Figure 12.** An example of sexist and antisemitic aggression directed at Agnieszka Holland, who, as in the previous year, once again became the target of an intense hate campaign. The comment was posted on the X platform. Screenshot from 4.11.2024.



**Post translation:** *Just like a Jewess. All the legends about witches, sorceresses, or other old, disgusting, and vile hags with big noses who abduct children didn't come entirely out of nowhere. They always described those Talmudic vermin.*

**Figure 13.** An example of intersectional hate speech expressed in the digital space. The comment was posted on the X platform. Screenshot from 12.01.2024.

<sup>30</sup> Research clearly shows that this type of hatred leads to a real withdrawal of women from social and political life. This phenomenon is not limited to Poland - it occurs all over the world and poses a serious threat to the foundations of democracy, undermining pluralism and the right to equal participation in public life. More at: <https://www.ndi.org/tweets-that-chill> (accessed 9.05.2025).

## 7. Contemporary Holocaust denial as a weapon in political debate


In 2024, the Jewish Association Czulent recorded **91 incidents related to the denial or distortion of Holocaust history**. While it might seem that denial is a marginal phenomenon, the data indicate the opposite - it is a persistent, increasingly embedded part of the Polish information space and antisemitic landscape.

Contemporary Holocaust denial rarely takes the form of open denial of historical facts. Instead, it appears as belittling the number of victims, relativising the responsibility of the perpetrators, **claiming “Jewish complicity” or denying historical sources**. These forms of distortion of the Holocaust - which are reported by scholarly studies of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)<sup>31</sup> - are particularly dangerous because they take on the **guise of historical revisionism or ironic distance, thus masking their true, harmful nature**.

As many as **87 out of 91 cases** were classified as **abusive behaviour** - these are posts, comments, graphics in which the violence is not in physical form. Still, its power lies in destabilising collective memory and doubting the most fundamental historical facts.

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<sup>31</sup> More on: History under attack: Holocaust denial and distortion on social media, <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000382159> (accessed 9.05.2025).




**Figure 14.** Comment posted on Facebook. Screenshot from 8.02.2024.

**Post translation:** *Mass genocide, gassing, extermination camps — something terrible — but it was the Jews who inflicted this fate on other Jews!!! Mostly Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and other nations were dying, not Jews — the numbers are exaggerated! Today, we can say that Jews are responsible for all the conflicts in the world. The Khazar Jews — this nation should disappear completely from the face of the earth — if it didn't exist, there would be no harm and no wars around the world. Above all, we can thank the biggest families like the Rothschilds and Rockefellers. Today we have a clear example in what's happening in Ukraine — this armed conflict, as well as what's happening in Israel — it's all connected to the Jews, and they are responsible for all of it, whether anyone likes it or not.*

All cases were identified by online monitoring carried out by the Jewish Association Czulent. The data obtained clearly indicate the prevalence of negationism, which, despite its growing presence, is still sometimes marginalised and insufficiently treated as a threat requiring an adequate response. Negationism ceases to function as an anomaly and is **becoming an integral part of digital culture**, especially in the context of intensifying political events.

The example of the Gaza war illustrates the clear link between the rise of negationism and political conflict. In **42 out of 91 recorded incidents** (representing **46.15% of cases**), negationism emerged directly in the context of discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These cases are characterised, on the one hand, by extreme criticism of the State of Israel and, on the other, by the use of narratives comparing the actions of the Israeli government to the Nazi crimes of the Second World War. Theses such as: “Israel today uses methods similar to those of 1939”, “the Holocaust was merely a pretext” or “Jews who experienced suffering now become oppressors themselves”. Such

statements not only falsify historical facts, but also push the boundaries of social acceptability, instrumentalising antisemitism through the language of contemporary geopolitics, which poses a serious threat to public debate and historical memory.



**Figure 15.**

Comment posted on X.  
Screenshot from 3.10.2024.

**Post translation:** *Palestine > Israel, f\* the f\*ing Jews. Someone in '39 was right.*

The phenomenon of Holocaust denial is not only not diminishing, but also intensifying its functions, becoming a tool of identity construction, a political provocation and a means of deep social polarisation. The response to this problem cannot be limited to legal action alone. Comprehensive educational strategies, the introduction of digital memory hygiene and the systematic presence of experts and witnesses of history in the media space are necessary. Otherwise, the Holocaust will not only be undermined on a factual level, but also symbolically 'dismantled' - used as a weapon against those who survived, remember and uphold historical truth and moral responsibility.

## 8. From global politics to symbolic violence: an analysis of escalating incidents

Global political events clearly translate into an increase in antisemitic violence at the local level. **The highest increase** in antisemitic incidents in Poland was recorded **in January** (end of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas<sup>32</sup>) and **March 2024** (Israel resumes military operations<sup>33</sup>) can be linked mainly to the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, the anniversary related to the liberation of Auschwitz, International Holocaust Remembrance Day and the general geopolitical situation in the region may have contributed to increased tensions and an increase in antisemitic incidents. **There was also a significant increase in November**, a period of heightened military activity in Gaza.

On 28 November 2024, Russia launched a massive missile and drone attack on Ukraine's energy infrastructure<sup>34</sup>, the day of the highest increase in antisemitic incidents in the entire month. In turn, on the night of 26-27 November 2024, a monument dedicated to the Jewish inhabitants of Bilgoraj was profaned. An inscription referring to the Gaza conflict and containing antisemitic symbolism, including a swastika, appeared on the monument.<sup>35</sup>


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32 <https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/wejscie-w-zycie-zawieszenia-broni-w-wojnie-izraela-z-hamasem> (accessed 9.05.2025).

33 <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2025-03-21/izrael-zrywa-zawieszenie-broni-w-gazie> (accessed 9.05.2025).

34 <https://tvn24.pl/swiat/zmasowany-atak-rosji-na-infrastrukture-energetyczna-ukrainy-st8199071> (accessed 9.05.2025).

35 <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/zniszczono-zydowski-pomnik-w-bilgoraju-ekspert-nie-wyklucza-prowokacji> (accessed 9.05.2025).



**Chart 5:** Number of antisemitic incidents in Poland in 2024.

The increase in the number of antisemitic incidents recorded in January, March and November 2024 clearly confirms the correlation between geopolitical events and the intensity of local antisemitic reactions, which has been observed for years. The escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a particular point of reference - both the ceasefire in January and its breakdown in March, followed by increased hostilities in November, correlate with a marked increase in acts of hatred towards the Jewish community in Poland. These incidents are not a reaction to specific political actions, but a manifestation of **projective antisemitism**<sup>36</sup>, in which current international events become a pretext for fuelling local prejudice, hatred and conspiracy myths.

The case of 28 November 2024 - the day the Russian Federation carried out one of the largest missile-drone attacks on Ukraine since the beginning of the war - requires special analysis. This coincided with the most significant increase in antisemitic incidents in the entire month. Such a coincidence may indicate that **antisemitism today functions as a vent for social tensions**, not necessarily related to the topic of Jewishness. In this sense, it may function as a kind of rhetorical

<sup>36</sup> Projective antisemitism is a psychological and social mechanism for shifting negative traits, emotions or responsibility for various problems onto Jews or people perceived to be Jewish, without real justification. It functions as a form of scapegoating in which symbolic Jews are blamed for political, economic or social crises, leading to the perpetuation of stereotypes, prejudices and the growth of antisemitic attitudes.



‘vicious circle of hatred’<sup>37</sup>. Regardless of the actual connection to events, Jews remain an easy and historically coded target for frustration, fears and aggression.

The incident on the night of 26-27 November in Bilgoraj, where a monument dedicated to the town’s Jewish community was desecrated, illustrates how **symbolic violence** is embedded in the international context, giving it a local, very specific meaning. The use of Nazi symbolism and references to the Gaza Strip shows that antisemitic narratives not only do not disappear but are actively transformed and adapted to contemporary realities.

These findings confirm that **antisemitism - even if triggered by distant events - requires a national response and accountability**. Effective counteraction cannot be limited to prosecuting individual incidents. Still, it must include countering narratives that normalise hate speech under the guise of ‘political commentary’, fuel resentment and perpetuate false perceptions of the Jewish community as guilty, hostile or suspicious. Antisemitism is not a phenomenon out of context - it reflects it. For this reason, systemic vigilance is required.

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37 The vicious circle of hatred - is a socio-psychological mechanism in which mutually escalating negative emotions, prejudices and acts of hostility create a self-perpetuating cycle. In this process, acts of hatred trigger retaliatory reactions or escalation of conflicts, leading to further polarisation, deepening of stereotypes and perpetuation of hostility between social groups. The result is the persistence and escalation of negative attitudes and violence, which becomes increasingly difficult to break without conscious intervention.

## Presidential elections

Author: Joanna Grabarczyk-Anders

Based on our ongoing monitoring of antisemitic content appearing in the digital space - intensifying especially during election campaign periods - we identify a clear and recurring **pattern of instrumental use of hate speech in political and social communication.**

As part of our analysis, we have produced two detailed reports on the use of hateful content during election campaigns. These reports document the **growing presence of dehumanising narratives, with a particular focus on antisemitic ones, both in public debate and in actions taken on social media platforms.** The source material indicates that these messages are not solely the result of the activities of anonymous internet users but are part of a deliberate political strategy aimed at building support for specific actors on the public scene.

Of note is the systematic use of antisemitic motifs in MEP Grzegorz Braun's campaigns, which are present both in his public statements and in provocative and performative media activities. These strategies resonate in the media and social networks, attracting the attention of selected groups of voters and significantly increasing online reach.

Grzegorz Braun and his milieu consistently use the same linguistic calques, referring to the classic repertoire of antisemitic content, often hermetic and difficult to understand for some of the audience. Nevertheless, these calques are reproduced and perpetuated in online communication, especially on social media platforms. Their presence in public debate, a fundamental part of the electoral process, **is no longer a marginal phenomenon on the internet.**




**Figure 16.**

Comment posted on X.  
Screenshot from 28.05.2025.

**Post translation:** – God bless! My name is Braun. Grzegorz Michał Braun. This is Poland! Not Brussels, not Ukropol or Ukropolin, not a German province or a Soviet republic, not an American colony. Poland! Above all, for Poles! No one will dictate how to govern and manage our native land!

In the context under analysis, antisemitism functions not only as an expression of prejudice but also as a vehicle for broader disinformation narratives. In particular, this applies to conspiracy myth narratives in which Jews are portrayed as alleged organisers or beneficiaries of hidden power mechanisms that threaten state sovereignty and public security. Such narratives heighten the sense of insecurity, polarise public debate and undermine trust in democratic institutions.



**Figure 17.**

Comment posted on X.  
Screenshot from 21.03.2025.

**Post translation:** *The Holocaust is a hoax, 6 million Jews did not die. This is indicated by statistics and population censuses before World War II and after World War II...*

Based on the data collected, “nearly **10 million** mentions of Jews (9,797,261) were observed over 2 years (731 days), or an average of **13,403 mentions per day**. Of all mentions, 39.1 per cent contained neutral references to the general category of Jews and 41.5 per cent to the general category of Israel/Palestine. Of the total mentions, **22.8% were negative and 18% were strictly hateful**”<sup>38</sup>.



**Post translation:**


*Jews in the house. Get out. Let them light their candles in underground tunnels beneath New York, not in the Polish Parliament. Bravo to Grzegorz. We're waiting for him to drive them out once and for all. Pure evil and Freemasonry in its most unfiltered form.*

**Figure 18.**

Comment posted on X.  
Screenshot from 28.05.2025.

<sup>38</sup> M. Winiewski, Information on antisemitism in Poland in the light of current social research, at a meeting of the Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities of the Sejm. - 17.10.2024.

Particularly worrying is the **integration of antisemitic and anti-Ukrainian content into a coherent disinformation frame** aimed at fostering social fears and antagonism towards minorities and migrants. Such messages have the potential to radicalise social attitudes, escalate inter-group tensions and spread violence, both symbolic and physical. Given their destabilising nature, especially during election campaign periods, this phenomenon requires in-depth analysis and an adequate response from public institutions responsible for information security and constitutional order.



**Figure 19.**

Comment posted on X.  
Screenshot from 18.05.2025.

**Post translation:** *For me, announcing the results one minute after the polls closed is a FRAUD! But go ahead and celebrate — your torturer, POPIS, won again. Boat people, Ukrainians, and Jews will now dictate how you should live. Thank you, Mr. Grzegorz, for everything you have done. @GrzegorzBraun\_ This was my last time voting.*

## 10. Summary

The year 2024 has shown that antisemitism in Poland has not disappeared, weakened or “civilised”. It has only changed form - **we see it less often in the form of physical attacks, but more often in posts, comments, memes, stickers and “just asking questions” statements.** 1,493 incidents were analysed. These are not ‘individual pranks’, but **massive, everyday hate language** that spills over the web and into public spaces. We are dealing with what Rob Nixon described as ‘low voltage violence’<sup>39</sup> - not necessarily spectacular, but constantly present and toxic.

**Organised insult campaigns**, characterised by repetitive content and mass replication in online posts and comments, were particularly ramped up in 2024. Their aim is to saturate the public space with messages in which **the ‘Jew’ functions as a universal symbol of global conspiracy, coloniser and enemy of national identity.** This dynamic transform public debate into a symbolic battlefield, where people of Jewish origin, real or imagined, become scapegoats for collective tensions and social frustrations.

It is also worth noting **the intersectionality of prejudices:** in many cases, **antisemitism is combined with misogyny** (e.g. towards women with a visible Jewish identity), **anti-Ukrainianism or homophobia.** Such hate speech is no longer ‘simply antisemitic’ - it is intersectional and part of a broader landscape of ideological hate speech. It is in these areas that the risk of physical violence increases, because words have consequences.

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39 R. Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*, Harvard University Press 2011. In this book, Nixon introduces the concept of low-voltage violence (slow violence), defining it as ‘violence that occurs gradually and out of sight; violence of delayed destruction, diffuse in time and space, devastating violence that is not usually seen as violence’. Although Nixon focuses mainly on environmental issues such as climate change, pollution or deforestation, his concept is also applicable to the analysis of other forms of violence that are stretched over time and often invisible at first glance. One example is systemic antisemitism, which manifests itself in everyday prejudice, hate speech or Holocaust denial, often masked as criticism of Israeli policies.

**The Holocaust denial that accompanies anti-Israel propaganda** is also a worrying phenomenon. In these narratives, the Holocaust is sometimes downplayed or denied, and its victims portrayed as aggressors. This kind of rhetoric not only falsifies history, but also **deepens prejudice and hatred towards the Jewish community.**

The report by the Jewish Association Czulent does more than just document facts - it brings them out of the shadows, a sphere overlooked by official statistics and public indifference. It makes a fundamental contribution to understanding the scale and specificity of a problem that is often ignored or marginalised. Such a detailed, systematic analysis is a prerequisite for an effective zero tolerance policy. Without reliable knowledge of what is happening, where and when, adequate action to counter the phenomenon cannot be taken.

It is not enough to conduct general education about tolerance - it is time to recognise that anti-semitism is a phenomenon embedded in a historical context, driven by specific mechanisms and producing real, painful consequences. Antisemitism will not disappear on its own - combating it requires courage, tenacity and a deep awareness. This responsibility rests not only on the shoulders of politicians and institutions, but also on the shoulders of teachers, the media, the moderators of digital platforms and each one of us. Only by acting together with determination can we break this destructive cycle and build a society resistant to hate.

**Don't be indifferent.**

If you have experienced  
or witnessed antisemitism -  
**report it!**

Go to

**[zglosantysemityzm.pl](https://zglosantysemityzm.pl)**

or call:

**12 400 00 08**

**Your report makes  
a difference.**



## 11. Description of the organisation

The Jewish Association Czulent is an advocacy organization working for a society based on democratic values and respect for human rights. Through a variety of initiatives, it aims to promote attitudes of openness with a particular including countering antisemitism.

We focus on a comprehensive and innovative approach to today's societal challenges. We aim for sustainable and systemic change, integrating individual support, institutional development, education and advocacy.

- **360° approach** - we monitor, educate, support, advise and initiate legislative change.
- **We think systemically** - integrating legal, social and educational perspectives in designing solutions.
- **We use new technologies** - analysing data, creating innovative tools and supporting the implementation of effective public policies.

Our work is based on trust, cooperation and building lasting partnerships.

- **We build cross-sectoral alliances** - working with public administration, universities, community organisations, the judiciary and law enforcement.
- **We create and support national and international coalitions**, working both locally and internationally to build partnerships for human rights and anti-discrimination.
- **We work with more than 60 partners in Poland and abroad** - including local governments, public institutions and civil society organisations.

**Antisemitism is part of a broader phenomenon** - we are countering it through comprehensive measures. Antisemitism does not exist in a vacuum, which is why we also counter other forms of discrimination, disinformation and hate ideologies. We act in two ways: we react to the effects and eliminate the causes.

How do we do it?

- **Education and awareness** - we carry out educational activities that change social attitudes and promote equality.
- **Monitoring and analysis** - we investigate and report on hate, discrimination and misinformation phenomena to effectively counter them.
- **Advocacy** - we influence the creation of public policies that address the causes of exclusion and counter hate speech.
- **Coalitions and collaborations** - we work with NGOs, public institutions, and the private sector to create alliances for equality.
- **Victim support** - we offer legal and psychological help and support to people affected by violence and discrimination.

Needs-oriented - helping people and strengthening civil society

- **We provide free legal aid** to people affected by hate crime, offering support in asserting their rights and accessing justice.
- **We support the development of minority organisations and activist individuals**, helping them to build their capacity, organise their activities and strengthen their voice in their communities.
- **We activate individuals** and support their participation in public life by involving them in social, educational and civic projects.
- **We monitor and report on antisemitic incidents** and bias-motivated crimes, collecting data and publishing reports that support prevention and public policies against hate.

## 12. Activities of the Jewish Association Czulent

The website [zglosantysemityzm.pl](https://zglosantysemityzm.pl) and the accompanying helpline (tel. **12 400 00 08**) are key tools for monitoring and countering antisemitism in Poland, run by the Jewish Association Czulent. They aim to provide any person, regardless of legal status, identity or place of residence, with an **easy, safe and anonymous way to report antisemitic incidents**.

Applications can be submitted via a simple form on the website or, if direct contact is required, by telephone via a helpline open on working days. Experts then analyse all cases and classify them according to the verified methodology and IHRA definitions, as well as Polish law.

The platform makes it possible to document cases of symbolic, verbal and physical violence that often go unrecorded by state institutions. It is also a real support for victims and witnesses and an important tool for advocacy and public education.

### **13. Project description: “Comprehensive strategy for counteracting antisemitic hate speech in the public space”**

The project, implemented by the Jewish Association Czulent, aims to create and implement a comprehensive strategy to counter antisemitic hate speech in public spaces. The initiative stems from the need to raise awareness of the harmfulness of hate speech motivated by antisemitism and ensure effective methods of responding to such behaviour.

As part of the implementation of this three-year project, the Jewish Association Czulent pursues key objectives:

- raise awareness in the Jewish community about hate speech and its effects,
- equip this community with tools to identify and report hate speech, including that disseminated online and that used for political purposes,
- to create and implement support mechanisms for those reporting hate speech that fulfils the characteristics of a hate crime,
- take advocacy action to respond more effectively to incidents of hate speech,
- building alliances in support of countering antisemitism both online and offline,
- raise awareness among policymakers and local authorities of the dangers of hate speech.

The project strategy focuses on three main pillars of action:

- Legal assistance - providing professional legal support at every stage of criminal proceedings, from the crime reporting to the trial, to minimise procedural errors and support victims.
- Strategic litigation and educational activities - educational activities, conferences, seminars, workshops and promotion of good practices related to the handling of hate crimes.

- Advocacy and cooperation - advocacy activities targeting political actors, local authorities, and the Jewish community and creating a platform for exchanging experiences with NGOs and legal professionals.

This project is not only designed to combat antisemitism, but also to build a more united, aware and secure community, ready to counter hate speech effectively.

The project was funded by the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” (EVZ).

## 14. Biograms:

**Anna Chipczyńska** is a activist in the Polish Jewish community. Member of the Board of the Jewish Association Czulent since 2024, Chairperson of the Board of the Jewish Community in Warsaw from 2014 to 2018, member of the Consultative Council for Resistance to International Disinformation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Awarded the “Warsaw Ghetto Uprising” medal of honour for her contribution to reconciliation between Poles and Jews and her commitment to combating antisemitism. Graduate of the University of Warsaw, Central European University and BPP Law School in London, scholarship holder at Tel Aviv University in 2003-2004. In the past, she was also professionally involved with the World Jewish Congress and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

**Joanna Grabarczyk-Anders** is a social activist with fifteen years of experience in the area of hate speech, bias-motivated crime, and online safety. Co-founder of the Hejtstop campaign. Collaborating expert with the Jewish Association Czulent. She is a member of the Team for Counteracting Hate Speech and Bias Motivated Crimes at the Attorney General’s Office. Her expertise includes researching, analysing and reporting on the scale of hate-motivated incidents, the use of hate content in electoral campaigns, the removal of illegal content by IT services and disinformation phenomena in social media. She also specialises in underreporting issues in minorities organisations. As a qualified trainer in the field of online security, hate speech and bias-motivated crime conducts training courses for various professional groups, including police, lawyers, content administrators and minority organisations. Her areas of interest also include the responsibility of network content administrators, securing and collecting evidence and identifying offenders.

**Piotr Kwapisiewicz** - social activist, has been involved in advocacy for over 17 years, social participation and countering antisemitism, hate speech, hate crimes and other forms of discrimination.

Minorities Scholar Fellowship, a programme of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Council (OHCHR/UN). Graduate of the School of Leaders of the Polish American Freedom Foundation. As an expert in the area of hate crimes and hate speech, antisemitism, he worked with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR/OSCE), European Judicial Training Network. He provides training in the field of the role of multilateral cooperation from a security management perspective in cooperation with European institutions and the police. He works to increase minority participation by training and initiating coalitions, partnerships, cooperation of national, ethnic and religious minority organisations with local and government administration. Between 2016 and 2021, member of the Interdisciplinary Team for cooperation on the implementation of the 'Open Krakow' programme. Author of reports on the inclusion of minorities in decision-making processes, analyses of minority organisations and training programmes on advocacy and participation for male and female activists of national and ethnic minority organisations. He currently serves as chairman of the board of the Jewish Association Czulent, a Jewish advocacy organisation.

**Anna Makówka-Kwapisiewicz** - historian, social activist, expert in the field of public engagement and human rights protection. From 2016 to 2025, she worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs as a programme manager, implementing projects to strengthen political and civic organisations and promote citizen participation, government transparency and accountability. Expert with experience in advocacy, promoting tolerance and shaping attitudes of openness towards minorities, focusing on countering antisemitism, including cross-discrimination. In her international activities she has cooperated with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Liberal Forum (ELF), the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the Ombudsman, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, the International Council of Jewish Women (ICJW), the American Jewish Committee (AJC), among others.

**Anna Zielińska** - expert on tolerance and non-discrimination. Jewish Association Czulent board member, working on hate crimes, hate speech, antisemitism and advocacy. Member of the Steering Committee of the ENCATE Network and member of the Executive Committee of the International Council of Jewish Women (ICJW). Member of the advisory board of the Centre for Combating Antisemitism and Intolerance in Belgrade. She has served as an Advisor on antisemitism at the OSCE/ODIHR and as an advisor to the Jewish Religious Community in Warsaw. She graduated in

law from the University of Warsaw and Cambridge British Law School and completed postgraduate studies in Middle East politics and history at Tel Aviv University. Her advocacy work began with a scholarship at the American Jewish Committee DC office and directing two conferences on the Middle East organised in Poland for AIPAC. She is the author of publications on international law, tolerance and non-discrimination.



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