
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Antisemitism in Poland 2025. Trends, Narratives, and the Experiences of the Jewish Community

/Annual report



Antisemitism in Poland 2025.


Trends, Narratives, and the Experiences of the Jewish Community

www.zglosantysemityzm.pl

Krakow 2026

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1.INTRODUCTION

The year 2025 marked yet another period during which antisemitism remained a persistent phenomenon in both the public sphere and digital environments. The data collected by the Czulent Jewish Association provide a comprehensive picture of contemporary manifestations of hatred directed against the Jewish community, whose nature, scale and methods of dissemination require both in-depth analysis and a decisive institutional response.

This report presents data on hate crimes, antisemitic incidents and antisemitically motivated hate speech reported to the Czulent Jewish Association during 2025 through the *www.zglosantysemityzm.pl* platform, together with information obtained through the organisation's systematic monitoring of online content.

The analysis demonstrates that the dominant category of incidents continues to be abusive behaviour, including derogatory comments, insults, mockery, humiliation and other forms of symbolic violence. At the same time, acts of vandalism, property damage, threats, verbal attacks and incidents of physical violence were also recorded, confirming the continuing presence of traditional manifestations of antisemitism in public life.

Among the different forms of incidents, hate speech was by far the most prevalent. It appeared both independently and in conjunction with anti-Jewish stereotypes, conspiracy myths, Holocaust denial and distortion, as well as antisemitism related to Israel. The internet - particularly social media platforms - remains the principal channel through which hateful content is disseminated.

During 2025, such content increasingly took the form of memes, graphics, videos, musical adaptations, visual symbols, and political commentary, all circulated across numerous online communities.

A key factor in interpreting the 2025 data is a methodological change in how certain online incidents are registered. In the case of repeated activities - such as a series of posts by a single user, repeated publication of identical material, activity originating from one account or initiative, rebroadcasts of the same event, or distribution of identical recordings across different platforms - a report could be treated as a single, comprehensive analytical unit. This approach provides a more accurate representation of genuine trends, patterns of repetition and the dynamics of online antisemitism rather than simply counting individual posts. **Consequently, a lower number of separately recorded online reports should not be interpreted as evidence of a decline in antisemitism.**

This report does not represent the total number of antisemitic incidents occurring in Poland. Due to the long-observed phenomenon of underreporting, the actual scale of the problem remains significantly larger than the available data suggest. This challenge affects not only public authorities and law enforcement agencies but also civil society organisations providing support to victims of discrimination and hate crime.

Despite these limitations, the reporting system - based on cooperation with the Jewish community, individual reports, systematic online monitoring and expert verification - makes it possible to identify the principal trends in antisemitism in Poland and the threats faced by members of the Jewish community.

The 2025 report is analytical and expert-based. It combines qualitative and quantitative analysis while taking into account relevant legal considerations and potential criminal-law classifications of reported incidents. At its core remains the perspective of victims and the need to document violence in a manner that not only measures its scale but also explains the mechanisms through which antisemitism affects society.

Beyond statistical data and methodological discussion, particular attention is devoted to developments that became especially visible in 2025. These include the memefication of antisemitism, the recycling of hateful slogans and songs, the increase in Holocaust denial and distortion, the activity of political movements employing antisemitic narratives, mobilisation surrounding the Jedwabne debate, the use of artificial intelligence to generate hateful content, and the use of visual codes to identify individuals and institutions perceived as Jewish, Israeli or „Zionist."

Antisemitism is not solely a problem affecting the Jewish community. It is also an indicator of the quality of public debate, levels of social trust and the resilience of democratic institutions. Wherever hatred directed against minorities becomes an instrument of political mobilisation, online entertainment or conspiracy theories, society's capacity to respond to crises in a rational, democratic and solidaristic manner is weakened.

2. METHODOLOGY

General Framework

The report covers antisemitic incidents that occurred in Poland between 1 January and 31 December 2025 and were reported to the Czulent Jewish Association via its online reporting platform or identified through the systematic monitoring of the digital space.

The data collection process is based on cooperation with individuals who have experienced prejudice-motivated violence, civil society organisations, and the analysis of publicly available online content. The monitoring covered social media platforms, news portals, internet forums, and other digital communication spaces.

Each incident was subject to substantive verification conducted by a trained analytical team. The verification included an assessment of the context of the incident, the language used by the perpetrator, and the potential biased motivation. In ambiguous cases, a team consultation procedure was applied, together with reference to international standards, including the guidelines of the

OSCE, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance.

The operational basis for the classification of incidents was the Working Definition of Antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).[1] This definition makes it possible to identify both direct manifestations of hostility towards persons of Jewish origin and more complex forms of prejudice, such as the delegitimisation of the State of Israel or the relativisation of the memory of the Holocaust.

Classification of Incidents

In 2025, a methodological change was introduced to the recording of online incidents in order to better describe trends and the actual dynamics of antisemitism rather than merely the number of individual posts. The activity of the same user, profile, channel or initiative - including a series of comments, posts or repeated publications of the same material - is not counted as a separate incident for each publication if it forms part of a single activity, narrative or campaign. Such cases are recorded as one comprehensive report and one analytical unit, with the scale, repetition and dissemination context duly noted. This applies, among other things, to accounts publishing numerous antisemitic materials, the mass sharing of retransmissions or recordings of antisemitic meetings across multiple copies and services, and situations in which numerous antisemitic statements or actions occur during a single event. Therefore, the number of individual online reports may appear lower than if each post were counted separately, although the scale of antisemitism - its intensity and repetitiveness - is significantly greater.

As in previous years, analytical categories based on the methodology of the British Community Security Trust (CST)[2], adapted to Polish reality, and on the standards developed by the European Network on Monitoring Antisemitism (ENMA)[3] were applied. By maintaining the same classification structure, it is possible to compare the 2025 data directly with the results from previous years and to analyse changes in the scale and nature of incidents recorded in the public sphere.

A separate category consists of incidents occurring in the digital space, which in 2025 reached a scale unprecedented in previous years. This phenomenon is associated with the growing role of social media as the primary channel for disseminating hateful narratives, as well as with the continuing sense of impunity among perpetrators, resulting, among other things, from the difficulty of identifying them and the limited effectiveness of legal enforcement in the digital environment.

It should also be emphasised that the lower number of online incidents recorded compared with the previous year does not indicate a decline in the scale of antisemitism in the digital space. The data presented in this report are the result of internet monitoring conducted by the Czulent Jewish Association, based on extensive linguistic corpora and expert content analysis. In our monitoring, we use the SentiOne social listening tool, which enables the identification of publicly available online content based on complex sets of keywords, linguistic variants, codes, euphemisms, spelling errors, slogans and narratives characteristic of antisemitic hate speech. The analytical team verified the results obtained through automated tools. Consequently, the report is not limited to simply counting individual posts but captures broader trends, recurring narratives and the actual dynamics of the spread of antisemitism online.

The legal basis for the classification of the analysed incidents consists of the provisions of the Polish Criminal Code, in particular:

- **Article 256 of the Criminal Code**, criminalising the public promotion of totalitarian regimes and incitement to hatred on the grounds of national, ethnic, racial or religious affiliation, or lack of religious affiliation;
- **Article 257 of the Criminal Code**, concerning the public insult of individuals or groups and the violation of their bodily integrity on the above-mentioned grounds;
- **Article 119 of the Criminal Code**, criminalising the use of violence or unlawful threats against an individual or a group of persons because of their national, ethnic, racial, political or religious affiliation, or because of their lack of religious affiliation;

1 Definition adopted by Poland in 2016 within the membership of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance – IHRA. *https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-antysemityzmu-przyjeta-przez-miedzynarodowy-sojusz-na-rzecz-pamieci-o-holokauscie* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

2 *https://cst.org.uk/* (accessed:22.06.2026)

3 *https://enma.eu* (accessed:22.06.2026)

- **Article 55 of the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance,** concerning the public denial, contrary to facts, of Nazi crimes, communist crimes, and other crimes against peace, humanity or war crimes referred to in the Act.

The key criterion for classifying an event as a bias-motivated crime remains **the perpetrator's motive**, understood as conduct directed against an individual or group because of their actual or perceived membership in a protected category.

Antisemitic incidents[4] – including events that do not constitute criminal offences under Polish law - are classified in this report into six categories: physical violence, assault, damage to property, threats, abusive behaviour, and mass propaganda. **Physical violence** includes acts endangering life or health, while assault refers to less serious forms of attack, including attempted assaults. **Damage to property** includes intentional destruction, including antisemitic graffiti and markings directed against property, memorial sites, and Jewish institutions or institutions perceived as Jewish. **Threats** are understood as direct expressions of intent to use violence, while **abusive behaviour** encompasses all antisemitic statements and actions, including those occurring online. **Mass propaganda** refers to the dissemination of antisemitic content to a broad, unspecified audience. Public assemblies containing such content are also recorded; the event as a whole is classified as abusive behaviour, while any acts of violence or threats are recorded as separate incidents.

In analysing reported content, we distinguish five principal forms of antisemitism:

- **The paradigm of otherness** – perceiving Jews as "outsiders" who do not belong to the majority society;
- **Anti-Judaism (traditional antisemitism)** – based on religious prejudice and stereotypes (e.g., accusations of deicide);
- **Contemporary antisemitism** – referring to the concept of an alleged "collective Jewish mind" that attributes common hidden goals, excessive influence over public life, and collective responsibility for the actions of Jewish individuals, organisations, and institutions;
- **Post-Shoah (secondary) antisemitism** – including Holocaust denial or distortion and denial of perpetrators' responsibility[5];
- **Israel-related antisemitism (anti-Zionism)** – where criticism of the State of Israel exceeds the boundaries of legitimate political debate and takes the form of demonisation, delegitimisation, or the application of double standards toward the Jewish state, in accordance with the IHRA Working Definition and Natan Sharansky's 3D Test.

Glossary

As part of its activities and the development of its monitoring methodology, the Jewish Association Czulent applies the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism[6], as well as the IHRA working definitions of Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion[7]. The Association also refers to the definitions of antisemitic hate crimes developed by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)[8].

Antisemitism – a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward them. Antisemitism manifests itself in speech and actions directed against Jews or non-Jews, their property, as well as Jewish community institutions and religious facilities[9].

Antisemitic incident – any event involving hostility, violence, or discrimination motivated by antisemitic bias.

4 The term „antisemitic incident" is used in accordance with the practice of international institutions monitoring antisemitism and hate crime, including the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). It encompasses both acts that constitute violations of the law and incidents that do not amount to criminal offences under criminal law but are nevertheless relevant, due to their nature, for documenting and analysing manifestations of antisemitism.

5 The Jewish Association Czulent applies the working definition of Holocaust denial and distortion in accordance with the guidelines of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). *https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-negacjonizmu-i-zniekształcania-prawdy-historycznej-o-holokauscie* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

6 More at: *https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-antysemityzmu-przyjeta-przez-miedzynarodowy-sojusz-na-rzecz-pamieci-o-holokauscie* (accessed: 22.06.2026).

7 More at: *https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-negacjonizmu-i-zniekształcania-prawdy-historycznej-o-holokauscie* (accessed: 22.06.2026).

8 More at: *https://hatecrime.osce.org/* (accessed: 22.06.2026).

9 The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism. For more information on the definition, see our publication: P. Kwapisiewicz, A. Zielińska, The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism: An Analysis. Żydowskie Stowarzyszenie Czulent, 2021. *https://czulent.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/definicja-antysemityzmu-ihra-omowienie.pdf*. (accessed: 22.06.2026)

Antisemitic hate crime – although the Polish criminal justice system does not contain a statutory definition of a bias-motivated crime, such offences have been defined by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). According to this definition, "hate crimes are criminal acts motivated by bias against a particular group of people".[10] All hate crimes share two defining characteristics: they constitute criminal offences, and the offender acts out of prejudice.

Hate speech – expressions that propagate, promote, or incite, in any form, denigration or hatred against an individual or group of individuals, including harassment, insults, negative stereotyping, stigmatisation, or threats directed at such persons because of race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic or personal status[11]. Polish criminal law does not contain a legal definition of hate speech.

Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion constitute a form of propaganda that denies the historical reality and scope of the Holocaust (Shoah) - the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis and their collaborators during the Second World War.

Holocaust denial includes, in particular, attempts to claim that the Holocaust never occurred. It may involve publicly denying or casting doubt upon the principal methods of extermination, such as gas chambers, mass shootings, starvation, or torture, as well as denying the intent to commit genocide against the Jewish people.

Forms of denial may also include accusing Jews of exaggerating or inventing the Holocaust for political or financial gain, portraying it as the outcome of a Jewish conspiracy. Holocaust denial often seeks to rehabilitate open antisemitism, promote extremist political ideologies, create conditions conducive to similar atrocities in the future, shift responsibility onto Jews, and re-legitimise antisemitism[12].

Holocaust distortion includes, among other things:

- deliberate attempts to justify the Holocaust or minimise its significance or essential elements, including the role of Nazi collaborators and allies;
- grossly understating the number of Holocaust victims in contradiction to credible historical evidence;
- attempts to blame Jews for causing the genocide committed against them;
- claims portraying the Holocaust as a positive historical event. Although such claims are not examples of Holocaust denial, they represent an extreme form of antisemitism by implying that the Holocaust was insufficiently effective in achieving the so-called "Final Solution to the Jewish Question";
- attempts to obscure responsibility for Nazi concentration and extermination camps by shifting blame onto other nations or ethnic groups.

Limitations of the study

When interpreting the findings, several factors affecting reporting rates should be taken into account, including levels of trust in public institutions, fear of secondary victimisation, and the social normalisation of certain forms of antisemitic behaviour. These factors are inherent limitations of monitoring studies of this kind.

Nevertheless, the methodology applied in this report - based on consistent criteria for identifying, classifying, and assessing incidents - allows for reliable monitoring of changes over time, analysis of emerging trends, and evaluation of the dynamics of contemporary antisemitism.

10 Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide. OSCE/ODIHR, 2018, p. 5. *https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/d/371116.pdf* (accessed: 22.06.2026).

11 For the purposes of the report, the understanding of hate speech is based on standards developed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which in this context refers, inter alia, to Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on "hate speech" and General Policy Recommendation No. 15 of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on combating hate speech from 2015.

12 The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion. *https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/robocza-definicja-negacjonizmu-i-zniekształcania-prawdy-historycznej-o-holokauscie* (accessed: 22.06.2026).

Overview: Antisemitic incidents reported in Poland in 2025

In 2025, **1,233 reports** of antisemitic incidents were analysed. Of these, 84 reports did not meet the verification criteria[13]. The final report, therefore, includes **1,149 confirmed incidents**, comprising:

- 1 instance of physical violence,
- 3 assaults,
- 21 threats,
- 22 instances of damage to Jewish property and memorial sites,
- 8 instances of mass propaganda[14],
- and 1,080 instances of abusive behaviour[15].

As in previous years, abusive behaviour in the online environment remained by far the most prevalent category. A total of **1,060 incidents** took the form of abusive behaviour, the overwhelming majority consisting of statements posted online, primarily on social media platforms.

13 The incident verification process is conducted in accordance with the adopted methodology of the Jewish Association Czulent, as described in this report. As a result, some reports were not classified as antisemitic incidents due to failure to meet the specified analytical criteria.

14 Mass propaganda is a deliberate, systematic activity aimed at shaping specific views, attitudes, and behaviours of large groups of people through the use of mass media such as radio, television, the press, or the internet.

15 Of these, 1,061 took place online, and 1,043 incidents occurred on social media platforms. Below is the distribution of cases of abusive behaviour online by platform: X – 944, Facebook – 59, TikTok – 18, Instagram – 8, YouTube – 8, Other – 5

The data for 2025 indicate the continuation of a growing trend whereby hate speech - representing the majority of online incidents - is increasingly taking the form of unlawful content that potentially violates provisions of Polish criminal law.




Chart 1. Offline incidents over the years.

The empirical material demonstrates that individual incidents frequently display characteristics of more than one category of antisemitism, highlighting their complex and multidimensional nature. In 2025, the dominant form remained **contemporary antisemitism, which - similarly to previous years - accounted for 55.5% of all recorded incidents** (n = 931).




Figure 1. Example of contemporary antisemitism. Post published on X. Screenshot taken on 2 January 2025.

Text: Poland is being indebted by international Jewish structures, and money is also transferred into the pockets of this mafia-like structure and for other purposes. As long as Poles do not become enlightened to the fact that an international mafia is managing them, they will continue to struggle as if in a cage.

A significant proportion of incidents also reflected the **paradigm of otherness**, portraying Jews as a group existing outside the broader social community. Narratives of this type were identified in 18.5% of all cases (n = 310). Furthermore, a substantial share of incidents involved Israel-related antisemitism, accounting for 15.7% of all recorded incidents (n = 263).

Antisemitism does not exist in a social vacuum and frequently co-occurs with other forms of prejudice and discrimination. **In 2025, the most common accompanying form of discrimination was sexism, which appeared in 21% of all recorded incidents** (n = 208).

Discrimination form	Incident's No
Sexism	208
Racism	41
anti-LGBTIQ	37
Romophobia	4

Table 1. Intersectionality of prejudice.

The 2024 report[16] documented a clear upward trend in antisemitic statements directed against women. Analysis of the 2025 material confirms that this phenomenon has persisted in both communication patterns and in the language used across online platforms.

This development should be understood within the broader transformation of contemporary anti-democratic movements, in which misogynistic narratives play an increasingly central role. Analyses of the so-called manosphere indicate an ongoing process of radicalisation in which content rooted in contempt for women, gender resentment, and perceived loss of social status increasingly functions as a major vehicle for political mobilisation[17]. From this perspective, sexism is not merely another co-occurring form of prejudice but rather an element of a broader ideological repertoire that contributes to the normalisation of exclusionary and authoritarian attitudes.

16 Antisemitic Incidents in 2024: A Survey of the Experiences of the Jewish Community. Jewish Association Czulent, 2025.*https://czulent.pl/antysemickie-incydenty-w-roku-2024-badanie-doswiadczenia-spolecznosci-zydowskiej/* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

17 Agnieszka Graff, „On the Manosphere: ‚We Are Dealing with a New Form of Fascism," OKO.press, 2026. *https://oko.press/agnieszka-graff-o-manosferze-mamy-do-czynienia-z-nowa-forma-faszyzmu* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

Importantly, these narratives also frequently incorporate conspiracy myths and simplistic explanations of social change, including antisemitic tropes centred on identifying alleged "hidden actors" responsible for societal developments[18]. As a consequence, different forms of prejudice reinforce one another, increasing both the intensity and the public visibility of the phenomena analysed.

Analysis of victim characteristics shows that, among incidents targeting identifiable individuals, men were more frequently victimised than women. **In 75.5% of such cases (n = 203), the victims were men, whereas 23% (n = 62) targeted women.**

From a temporal perspective, the annual distribution of incidents reveals a marked concentration during periods of heightened political activity. **The highest number of incidents (n = 29) was recorded on 18 May 2025**[19], the day of the first round of Poland's presidential election.

This finding is consistent with previous observations made by the Jewish Association Czulent, indicating that the volume of hateful content systematically increases during election campaigns, when antisemitism is more frequently employed as a tool of political mobilisation, delegitimisation of opponents, and polarisation of public debate.

Studies examining the 2023 parliamentary elections[20], the 2024 European Parliament elections[21] and the 2025 presidential election[22] demonstrated that election campaigns are characterised not only by an increase in the overall volume of hateful content but also by its greater visibility and instrumental use within political discourse.

18 Ibid

19 Official Results of the 2025 Presidential Election: The National Electoral Commission (PKW) Released Results from 100% of Polling Districts. *Onet.pl*. *https://www.onet.pl/informacje/onetwiadomosci/oficjalne-wyniki-wyborow-prezydenckich-2025-pkw-podala-dane-ze-100-proc-obwodow/kcj5hs4,79cfc278* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

20 Monitoring of Hate Content: Parliamentary Elections 2023. Jewish Association Czulent, 2023. *https://czulent.pl/monitoring-nienawistnych-tresci-podczas-wyborow-parlamentarnych-2023/* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

21 Monitoring of Hate Content: European Parliament Elections 2024. Jewish Association Czulent, 2024. *https://czulent.pl/monitoring-nienawistnych-tresci-podczas-wyborow-do-parlamentu-europejskiego-2024/* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

22 Monitoring nienawistnych treści. Wybory na Prezydenta 2025. Żydowskie Stowarzyszenie Czulent 2025. *https://czulent.pl/monitoring-nienawistnych-tresci-podczas-wyborow-prezydenckich-2025/* (accessed: 22.06.2026).

In particular, these studies emphasise that antisemitism - alongside other forms of prejudice - functions as a dynamic element of political and media debate, with its intensification closely linked to periods of electoral mobilisation and heightened political communication.

From an analytical perspective, these findings reinforce the argument that antisemitism functions during election periods as a discursive resource. In this context, it serves not merely as an expression of prejudice but also as a tool for political mobilisation, social polarisation, and the construction of interpretative frameworks surrounding electoral competition.

Another increase in reported incidents occurred on 27 May (n = 19), coinciding with the launch of humanitarian aid operations in Rafah[23]. A third peak was likewise connected with developments in the Gaza Strip. On 30 August, Israeli military operations in Gaza were ongoing while European Union foreign ministers met in Denmark to discuss possible sanctions against Israel[24]. A total of 17 incidents were recorded on that day.




Chart 2. Number of antisemitic incidents recorded in Poland in 2025.

23 Palestinians rush US-backed aid centre despite concerns over checks. Reuters 2025. *https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinians-wary-us-backed-aid-group-begins-operations-gaza-2025-05-27/?utm_source=chatgpt.com* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

24 Gaza Under Fire: Debate on Sanctions Against Israel [LIVE REPORT]. *Onet.pl https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/gaza-pod-ostrzalem-debata-o-sankcjach-dla-izraela-relacja/mntqk9r?utm_source=chatgpt.com_viasg_wiadomosci&utm_medium=referal&utm_campaign=leo_automatic&srcc=undefined&utm_v=2* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

4. Visualisation of the Scale and Dynamics of Antisemitic Incidents

Types of incidents

The quantitative analysis of antisemitic incidents recorded in 2025 enables identification the principal characteristics of the phenomenon and changes in its internal structure. The distribution of incident categories, their frequency, and their co-occurrence with other forms of prejudice provide valuable insight into the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself in contemporary Poland.

The data presented below enable identification dominant trends and analyse relationships between antisemitic incidents and the broader social, political, and media context in which they occur.




Chart 3. Percentage and numerical distribution of incidents by place of occurrence

Inicident type[25]	Incident's No
Physical attack	3
Verbal attack	15
Destruction of property	30
Holocaust denial and distortion	47
Hate Speach	1051
Other – not meeting the methodology criteria	59
Not applicable	30

Table 2. Categories selected by individuals reporting incidents when submitting reports through the online platform. These constitute the first stage of incident classification.




Chart 4. Categories of antisemitic incidents recorded in 2025.

25 Each reported incident is verified by an expert team.

As in previous years, the most frequently identified violations concerned Articles 256 and 257 of the Polish Criminal Code, respectively, the public incitement to hatred and the public insult of individuals or groups on the grounds of their national, ethnic, racial, or religious affiliation.

It should also be emphasised that individual antisemitic incidents often involved conduct potentially fulfilling the legal elements of more than one criminal offence simultaneously.

The following table and figure present the provisions of Polish criminal law, which, in the assessment of the expert team[26] may have been violated in incidents reported during 2025.

Legal qualification	Incident's No
art. 256 C.C.	612
art. 257 C.C.	529
art. 216 §2 C.C.	137
art. 126a C.C.	61
art. 190 §1 C.C.	19
art. 255 C.C.	15
art. 55 IPN Bill	14
art. 226 §3 C.C.	10
art. 119 C.C.	8
art. 261 C.C.	6
art. 217 §1 C.C.	3

Table 3. Criminal law provisions potentially violated in antisemitic incidents reported in 2025.

26 Each reported incident is assessed to determine whether the given event may meet the criteria of a prohibited act under the Polish Criminal Code. For this purpose, an expert team composed of lawyers and specialists in countering hate speech and bias-motivated crimes conducts a legal analysis of the collected material and assigns potential legal classifications to individual incidents.




Chart 5. Criminal law provisions potentially violated in antisemitic incidents reported in 2025

Forms of antisemitism

The assessment of the antisemitic character of reported incidents is based on the operational definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

One of the principal conclusions emerging from the analysis is the high degree of overlap between different forms and mechanisms of antisemitism within individual incidents. Contemporary antisemitism most commonly manifests itself as a complex phenomenon combining multiple narratives, stereotypes, and expressions of hostility toward Jews.

Analysis of incidents recorded in Poland in 2025 demonstrates a clear predominance of contemporary forms of antisemitism, occurring primarily in the digital environment, especially on social and communication platforms.

The most frequently identified category consisted of hate speech directed against Jewish individuals and the Jewish community.

Type of antisemitism	Incident's No	Percentage of all incidents*
Contemporary antisemitism	931	55,5%
Paradigm of otherness	310	18,5%
Israel-related antisemitism	263	15,7%
Post-Shoah antisemitism	124	7,4%
Anti-Judaism	25	1,5%

Note*: Percentages exceed 100% because individual incidents may be classified under more than one antisemitism category.

Table 4. Percentage distribution of different types of antisemitism in reported incidents in 2025.

Geographical Distribution of Offline Antisemitic Incidents

As in previous years, the highest number of offline antisemitic incidents reported in 2025 occurred in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (Mazovia Province). A total of 29 incidents were recorded there, accounting for 32.6% of all incidents reported in the physical environment. Of these, 28 occurred in Warsaw.

The Małopolskie Voivodeship (Lesser Poland Province) ranked second, with 28 reported incidents, 22 of which took place in Kraków.

Voivodship	Incident's No
dolnośląskie	6
kujawsko-pomorskie	1
lubelskie	2
lubuskie	1
mazowieckie	29
małopolskie	28
opolskie	1
podkarpackie	4
podlaskie	4
pomorskie	6
warmińsko-mazurskie	1
wielkopolskie	2
łódzkie	1
śląskie	2
świętokrzyskie	1

Table 5. Regional Distribution of Reported Offline Antisemitic Incidents by Voivodeship.

5. Examples of Antisemitic Incidents

The qualitative analysis of reported incidents makes it possible to view antisemitism not only through the lens of statistics but also through the concrete experiences of victims and how anti-Jewish narratives function in the public sphere. The selected cases illustrate the most common forms of hostility directed against Jews, demonstrating both their diversity and the recurring patterns and mechanisms by which they operate.

The examples presented include incidents recorded in both the physical and digital environments, including cases of hate speech, dehumanisation, instrumentalisation of Holocaust memory, and the use of antisemitic stereotypes. Their analysis provides a better understanding of the nature of contemporary antisemitism and how it manifested itself in Poland in 2025.

Physical Violence

- A man wearing a kippah, the traditional head covering worn by many religious Jews, was attacked by unidentified perpetrators. A bottle was thrown at him, striking him on the head. The attack was accompanied by vulgar abuse and antisemitic slurs. The incident was not reported to the police.

Assault

- A group of men attacked an Orthodox Jewish family on their way to prayer, shouting insults and antisemitic slogans, including "Jews to the gas" and "Fuck the Jews." During the incident, the perpetrators attempted to force their way onto the premises and attack those entering the place of worship, resulting in a physical altercation at the entrance gate. The security personnel prevented the attempt. The incident was reported to the police.

Threat

- An antisemitic comment was posted beneath a private Instagram post stating: "Die, you Jewish w***e. It's a shame Adolf Hitler is no longer alive."




Figure 2. Example of an antisemitic threat online. Comment published on Instagram. Screenshot taken on 17 February 2025.

Damage to Property

- A gravestone of Rebbetzin Ester Golda Kalisz, the wife of Tzaddik Menachem Kalisz of Mszczonów, located in the Jewish cemetery in Otwock-Anielin, was vandalised with a Star of David equated to a swastika.



Figure 3. Vandalised historic gravestone at the cemetery in Otwock-Anielin. Photo: Mirosław Pakuła.

- A memorial commemorating the Jews of the Falenica Ghetto was vandalised by painting over the Star of David and the commemorative plaque. The perpetrators also added Nazi and far-right symbols, including the "SS" insignia and a Celtic cross. The incident was reported to the police.



Figure 4. Vandalised memorial commemorating 6,500 Jews from the Falenica Ghetto.

Abusive Behaviour

- An antisemitic and anti-Ukrainian graffiti inscription appeared on a wall in Wrocław, reading: "Jews and Ukrainians, get out of Poland. Fucking scum." Following an intervention by the Wrocław Centre for Restorative Justice, the graffiti was removed.



Figure 5. Antisemitic and anti-Ukrainian graffiti in Wrocław. Photo: Wrocław, Ostrów Tumski.

- A post published on the X platform contained the phrase: "A Jew after transition." The post included a photograph of a bar of soap, referring to the antisemitic myth alleging that the bodies of Holocaust victims were used to manufacture soap.



Figure 6. Post published on X. Screenshot taken on 6 January 2025.

- A comment posted on X stated: “F**king Übermenschen. I believe that rich Zionist Jews financed the Holocaust of poor and assimilated Jews.”




Figure 7. Comment published on X. Screenshot taken on 17 April 2025.

- During an interview broadcast by Radio Wnet, conducted by journalist Łukasz Jankowski, Grzegorz Braun, the Member of the European Parliament, made a statement constituting Holocaust denial, declaring: “Ritual murder is a fact, whereas Auschwitz with gas chambers is unfortunately fake.”
- A post published on X stated: “DUDA IS A SERVANT OF JEWISH FASCISTS! Duda serves Ukrainians. Duda serves Jews. Duda serves everyone except Poles. President Andrzej Duda asked the Polish government to guarantee protection from arrest for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should he attend the commemorations marking the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, according to The Times of Israel. If Nawrocki is going to be the same kind of servant as Duda, then count me out. We do not need another term with a servant of a foreign nation at the head of the Polish state”[27]

27 „Jewish fascists” is an example of the increasingly common phenomenon known as Holocaust inversion, in which the victims of the Holocaust are portrayed as perpetrators. The concept of Holocaust inversion is described in an IHRA publication - Understanding Holocaust Distortion.Contexts, Influences and Examples. page 24 *https://holocaustremembrance.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Understanding-Holocaust-Distortion-Contexts-Influences-and-Examples-IHRA.pdf* (accessed: 22.06.2026)



Figure 8. Post published on X. Screenshot taken on 9 January 2025.

Trends in 2025

From an Isolated Insult to a Reproducible Mechanism of Hate

One of the most characteristic developments observed in reports from 2025 is the transformation of the isolated antisemitic insult into a reproducible and easily recognisable online format.

A particularly striking example is the obscene slogan "**F**k the Jews**", which appeared in reported content not only as a written comment but also as a refrain, slogan, meme, audio recording, video clip, and element of online performance culture.

Of particular significance was an antisemitic song circulated under the title "F* the Jews – Full Version." From an analytical perspective, the manner in which the material was presented is noteworthy: it was uploaded to an entertainment and meme-sharing platform and categorised as both **Entertainment** and **Music**. Consequently, hateful content was framed not as overt symbolic violence but rather as a song, joke, meme, or form of online entertainment.

In the analysed reports, short refrain-like expressions repeatedly appeared, including "F* the Jews," "F* a Jew," and abbreviated variants such as **"JŻS"** (english free translation: FJS – F**k Jewish Scum). Their significance did not lie in presenting elaborate arguments. Instead, they functioned as identity markers - short, rhythmic expressions that were easy to remember and repeat without additional commentary. Their brevity substantially increased their viral potential.

These slogans could readily be used as song refrains, image captions, comments, audio clips in short-form videos, elements of musical remixes, or coded expressions recognised by users familiar with their meaning and social function.

This mechanism is particularly significant because it shifts antisemitic content from the realm of conventional hate speech into the domain of entertainment. Users no longer need to formulate an antisemitic message of their own; it is sufficient to repeat a fragment, share a recording, use the title, sing the refrain, create a remix, or publish their own version. The musical and meme-based format may, in the eyes of some audiences, diminish the violent nature of the message by presenting it as irony, humour, or participation in an online trend.

Reports submitted in 2025 documented not only the song's circulation but also its continued recycling. The content was transferred across platforms, reproduced in multiple variants, adapted to different musical styles, and used as a ready-made template for hateful expression. Particularly alarming were cases in which identifiable individuals recorded themselves performing or replaying the song while showing their faces. This represents a shift from anonymous, text-based hostility to the open performative expression of antisemitism.

In this sense, users are no longer merely repeating a hateful slogan. They are publicly performing it, stylising it, sharing it, and incorporating it into their online self-presentation. Antisemitism thus becomes not only the content of an expression but also an act of participation - a way of signalling membership in a particular emotional community in which contempt for Jews is framed as humour, provocation, or an element of collective identity.

In the reports analysed for 2024, the obscene verb stem combined with references to Jews or Jewishness appeared in 429 incidents. In the 2025 dataset, this number increased to 555 incidents, representing an increase of 126 cases, or approximately 29.4% year-on-year, despite the overall number of analytical units included in the report being lower than in the previous year.

An even more pronounced increase was observed in the use of the recognisable abbreviation "JŻS" (english free translation FJS - F**k Jewish Scum) and slogans following the pattern "Day of F*ing Jews." In 2024, these appeared in 128 incident descriptions, whereas in 2025, they appeared in 320.

This represents an **increase of 192 cases, or 150% year-on-year.** In other words, the number of such reports in 2025 was 2.5 times higher than in 2024.




Figure 9. Comment published on X. Screenshot taken on 21 September 2025.

These findings indicate that the phenomenon is no longer limited to the occasional use of an obscene insult. Rather, it reflects the consolidation of a distinct communicative pattern. The slogan has become a recognisable code that can be used without further explanation while immediately signalling membership in a community of recipients who understand its meaning. In this way, hatred operates not only through its semantic content but also through the ritual of repetition.

Particularly important is the process of normalisation. A rhythmic song, its remixes, refrains, or associated memes reduce the social weight of the taboo. Content that, in another context, would be recognised as explicit hate speech begins to function as part of participatory internet culture, entertainment, or even a form of rebellion. It is commented on, remixed, parodied, performed, and further shared. As a result, antisemitism is more easily absorbed by new audiences, particularly younger social media users, for whom audio, musical, or meme-based formats may exert a stronger influence than traditional text-based messages.

In this respect, the the song's viral spread is one of the most significant examples of the transformation of online antisemitism in 2025. The issue is not simply the increased number of references but a change in form: antisemitism has become more rhythmic, repetitive, aestheticised, and easily adaptable for further dissemination. It now functions as a ready-made format that users can appropriate, modify, and circulate across successive digital environments with minimal effort.

Online Antisemitism as the Dominant Environment of Reported Incidents

In 2025, the overwhelming majority of analysed reports occurred in the digital environment. This confirms that the internet remains the principal arena for the dissemination of antisemitic hate speech, conspiracy narratives, visual materials, political commentary, and dehumanising content.

Online antisemitism, however, is not detached from social reality. Content published on the internet influences the language of public debate, how minorities are discussed, and the willingness of individuals to express contempt publicly towards people identified as Jews.

At the same time, offline incidents have not disappeared. Reports included cases of property damage, threats, verbal assaults, acts of vandalism, and physical violence. In 2025, the number of offline incidents was **10% higher than in 2024**, with 87 offline reports compared to 79 in the previous year.

These findings suggest that although the internet remains the principal channel for the dissemination of antisemitic content, the narratives and attitudes circulating online may contribute to creating a climate that facilitates acts of direct violence in public spaces.

The Importance of Independent Internet Monitoring

The 2025 data confirm the fundamental importance of internet monitoring conducted by the Jewish Association Czulent.

A substantial proportion of online antisemitism would remain invisible without active and systematic monitoring of digital spaces. The number of reports submitted by private individuals alone does not accurately reflect the true scale of the phenomenon.

Online antisemitism often takes highly fragmented forms, including comments posted beneath other users' content, repeatedly shared memes, reactions to political events, images, videos, or seemingly humorous adaptations. Such material is difficult to identify without social listening tools and extensive linguistic corpora capable of recognising linguistic variants, euphemisms, coded expressions, spelling variations, abbreviations, contextual usage, and deliberately disguised terminology.

Social Media Platforms and the Dominance of X

Among reports concerning the online environment, the overwhelming majority related to social media platforms. In 2025, **1,043 reports** fell into this category. The principal channel for the dissemination of antisemitic content remained X, which was identified in **944 reports**. Facebook appeared in **59 reports**, TikTok in **18**, Instagram and YouTube in **8 reports** each, while other social media platforms together accounted for **5 reports**.

This distribution highlights the particular role of platforms built around rapid reactions, political commentary, quotation, replies, and algorithmically amplified visibility. Throughout 2025, X served as the primary space for the immediate mobilisation of antisemitic discourse, particularly in response to statements by politicians, developments relating to Israel and Palestine, election campaigns, Holocaust-related debates, discussions concerning Jedwabne, and conspiracy narratives.

It should be emphasised that the dominance of a single platform does not imply that the phenomenon is confined to that platform alone. Antisemitic content regularly migrates across digital environments: a post becomes a screenshot, the screenshot becomes a meme, the meme is transformed into a video, and the video is subsequently redistributed via TikTok, Facebook, YouTube, or private messaging applications.

For this reason, the analysis of antisemitism in 2025 requires a cross-platform perspective, recognising that contemporary online hate functions as an interconnected digital ecosystem rather than as an isolated activity confined to individual platforms.

Dominance of Hate Speech and Abusive Behaviour

The most frequently identified incident type in 2025 was hate speech. It was recorded in **1,051 reports, accounting for 85.1% of the analysed material**. This finding confirms that, in 2025, antisemitism most commonly took the form of expressions such as comments, posts, slogans, graphics, recordings, memes, adaptations, and visual materials. This does not, however, imply a lower degree of harmfulness. Hate speech is not merely an "opinion" or an expression of emotions. In the analysed material, it functioned as a mechanism of public exclusion, stigmatisation, humiliation, dehumanisation, and the mobilisation of other users against individuals or groups identified as Jewish.

In some reports, hate speech assumed a formulaic pattern of communication: the same obscene phrases, slogans, and abbreviations were repeatedly used. In other cases, it was linked to political narratives, Holocaust denial or distortion, stereotypes concerning alleged Jewish control, anti-Ukrainian conspiracy narratives, or the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Increase in literal references to Auschwitz-Birkenau and gas chambers

In 2025, an increase in content related to the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration and extermination camp and gas chambers was observed. In reports from 2024, such references appeared in 26 cases, while in 2025 they appeared in **45 cases**. Significantly, some of this content constituted direct denialism, rather than merely veiled relativisation of history.

Within the analysed material, statements appeared denying the existence of gas chambers in Auschwitz-Birkenau, questioning established historical findings, or suggesting that knowledge about the Holocaust is a form of manipulation. Such content often became activated in the immediate context of media statements and actions by public figures, and was subsequently amplified in comments, graphics, and posts.




Figure 10. Comment published on X. Screenshot taken on 15 July 2025.

At the same time, Holocaust inversion was observed, i.e. the use of Holocaust memory to reverse the roles of victims and perpetrators and to portray Jews, Israel, or individuals supporting the Jewish community as equivalents of Nazis. Such narratives not only distort history but also transfer Holocaust symbolism into current political struggles and online mobilisation. In practice, they serve to delegitimise Jews as victims of antisemitism and weaken societal recognition of the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust.

In a broader context, this is consistent with observations by UNESCO[28], which indicates that Holocaust denial and distortion undermine historical knowledge and can fuel contemporary antisemitism. Generative AI may further amplify false and hateful narratives about the Holocaust by facilitating the creation of fabricated images, texts, pseudo-sources, and visual materials that simulate credibility.

Given the scale of the increase, the explicitness of some statements, and their linkage to the activity of public figures and the circulation of digitally generated content, **Holocaust denial, distortion of historical truth, and Holocaust inversion will be among our key analytical monitoring priorities in 2026.** Particular attention will be given to content denying the existence of gas chambers, relativising perpetrator responsibility, reversing victim–perpetrator roles, and materials using artificial intelligence to create falsified images and historical representations aimed at legitimising falsehoods and denialist narratives regarding the Holocaust.

28 AI and the Holocaust: rewriting history? The impact of artificial intelligence on understanding the Holocaust, UNESCO 2024 *https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/new-unesco-report-warns-generative-ai-threatens-holocaust-memory* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

The political framing of antisemitism: the electoral campaign, Grzegorz Braun, and the broader Confederation of the Polish Crown milieu

In 2025, antisemitism was strongly linked to the context of domestic politics and the election campaign. Of particular significance was the activity of Grzegorz Braun, individuals connected with the Confederation of the Polish Crown (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej), as well as the accounts of politicians, supporters, and profiles directly connected with this political milieu. References to Grzegorz Braun, the Crown, the Confederation of the Polish Crown, and the individuals and people associated with them appeared in **135 reports**, compared with 82 reports in 2024.

An important element of this trend was not only activity in the largest cities and the main media centres, but also an intensive presence in smaller towns. Individual meetings, local events, speeches, and materials produced during these activities built the recognition of this political milieu through the repetition of the same antisemitic tropes: narratives about “foreign influence,” “Jewish claims,” “Polin,” “the system,” the alleged subordination of the state to Jewish or Israeli interests, and conspiracy narratives concerning the alleged special position of Jews in public life. In this way, antisemitic content was transferred from niche online spaces to local debates, meetings, and coverage of political events.

Particularly alarming was the scale of repetition of these messages. The reported material revealed extensive activity by the accounts of politicians, supporters, and profiles directly associated with the Crown milieu, which disseminated prejudicial content on a mass scale. These messages frequently repeated the same false claims concerning Jews, conspiracy myths about alleged Jewish control, narratives of collective responsibility, and content delegitimising the memory of the Holocaust. The repetitive nature of these messages meant that antisemitic tropes functioned not as isolated statements made by individual users, but as an element of a broader, recognisable repertoire of communication.

Symbolism also played an important role. In the analysed material, the image of a fire extinguisher recurred, which in the communication of these groups functions as a direct symbol of Grzegorz Braun and his political recognisability. This symbol was used as an identifying sign, an element of memes, graphics, comments, and visual materials. In this context, the fire extinguisher ceases to be merely a reference to a specific event; it becomes a communicative shorthand that enables users to express support for a particular model of confrontational, anti-pluralist, populist, and antisemitic political communication.

In this area, antisemitism served as a language of delegitimisation. Jewishness, whether real or perceived, was used as a political accusation intended to suggest disloyalty, betrayal, foreign influence, or the subordination of Poland to Jewish or Israeli interests. In this way, antisemitic tropes were directed not only against the Jewish community, but also against political opponents, public institutions, the media, civil society organisations, and public figures. An alleged connection with Jews or Israel became a tool for stigmatisation and exclusion from the national community.

This trend gives rise to particular concern in the context of increasing social polarisation. The repetition of antisemitic conspiracy myths by political accounts, supporters, and circles associated with election activity increases their reach and lowers social barriers to this type of language. Content that might previously have been recognised as radical or marginal begins to function as an element of everyday political debate, online irony, memes, and campaign materials.

Particularly dangerous is the fact that, within the same communication environment, content normalising Holocaust denial, Holocaust inversion, and antisemitic symbolic violence also appeared. Statements challenging established historical findings, relativising the responsibility of the perpetrators, or reversing the roles of victims and perpetrators were reinforced by a political context in which antisemitism was presented as "the courage to speak the truth," "opposition to political correctness," or "the defence of the Polish national interest." Such a mechanism shifts the boundaries of acceptable public discourse. It increases the risk of further radicalisation and susceptibility to disinformation, while at the same time causing antisemitism to cease to be perceived solely as a form of prejudice and discrimination and instead to function as a positively valued element of the political or ideological identity of some participants in public debate.

In this sense, the activity of circles associated with the Confederation of the Polish Crown should be regarded not only as an element of the election campaign but also as a significant factor in the normalisation of antisemitism in public debate. It combines a local presence, high activity on social media platforms, repeating messaging, the use of recognisable symbols, and systematic references to antisemitic conspiracy myths. As a consequence, antisemitism becomes a tool for building political recognition, emotional mobilisation, and reinforcing social divisions.

Jedwabne as a site of antisemitic mobilisation

In 2025, one of the significant arenas for the mobilisation of antisemitic and revisionist content was activity centred on the memory of the Jedwabne massacre. In the analysed material, Jedwabne no longer functioned solely as a site of remembrance for the victims of the Holocaust but increasingly as a focal point for political, media, and financial mobilisation. Of particular significance were the activities of Wojciech Sumliński and the people associated with him, including the publication of books, video materials, promotional events, fundraising campaigns, and activities conducted in the immediate vicinity of the memorial to the victims of the massacre.



Figure 11. Polskie Radio Białystok, "Controversy following the Jedwabne anniversary. Prosecutor's Office investigates plaques; Yad Vashem calls it a desecration." Published on 11 July 2025; accessed on 22 June 2026. Photo: Paweł Wądołowski.

CAPTION: The unveiling of a memorial avenue featuring boulders and plaques whose inscriptions challenge the established historical finding that Poles participated in the Jedwabne massacre.

In 2025, Sumliński published a book on Jedwabne, which, in our assessment, reinforces a revisionist narrative concerning the crime committed on 10 July 1941. The publication was promoted as presenting the "truth" about Jedwabne; however, its message forms part of a broader pattern of questioning or relativising established historical findings, shifting responsibility, and suggesting that the memory of the victims constitutes an instrument of political pressure or a "Jewish" narra-

tive directed against Poland. In this sense, the book is not merely a historical and journalistic publication but part of a broader communication campaign that uses Jedwabne as a symbol of conflict over memory, guilt, and responsibility.

An important component of this process consisted of author meetings and events organised around the book and the narrative on Jedwabne. In our assessment, these events served not only to promote and sell the publication but also to build a community of recipients around the revisionist narrative. In practice, they created a space in which the same claims were repeatedly advanced: that history had allegedly been falsified, that it was necessary to "defend the good name of the Polish people," that there existed a "memory industry," "Polin," and alleged Jewish or international pressure. In this way, local promotional events became part of a broader circulation of antisemitic and post-Shoah narratives.

An important aspect of this phenomenon was also the monetisation of the narrative. Activities centred on Jedwabne were linked to the sale of books and films, the collection of donations, the mechanism allowing taxpayers to allocate 1.5% of their personal income tax through an intermediary foundation, and online fundraising campaigns for activities presented as commemorative or educational. According to information cited in media reports[29], Sumliński raised substantial funds for activities related to Jedwabne; amounts exceeding PLN 800,000 were reported, while one fundraising campaign under the slogan "Memorial Site in Jedwabne: The Earth Does Not Lie!" had reportedly exceeded PLN 418,000 as of September 2025. Subsequent reports also referred to additional funds collected through crowdfunding campaigns connected with the project.

From an analytical perspective, it is particularly significant that these fundraising campaigns were conducted in parallel with messaging that questioned or relativised the memory of the Jedwabne massacre. This indicates that the revisionist narrative performs not only an ideological function but also a mobilising and financial one. The memory of a Holocaust site was used to generate engagement, raise funds, strengthen the author's public profile, and build a community of recipients convinced of the need to "oppose" the official historical narrative.

29 To raise funds like Sumliński for Jedwabne. 800 thousand on a lie, hatred towards Jews, and the naivety of Poles. *https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/zbierac-jak-sumlinski-na-jedwabne-800-tys-na-klamstwie-nienawisci-do-zydow-i-naiwnosci-polakow-7201616983919232a* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

A further stage of this activity involved actions undertaken in the immediate vicinity of the memorial site. On a plot of land adjacent to the memorial commemorating the victims of the Jedwabne massacre, so-called alternative memorials or installations had previously been erected, together with announcements concerning the construction of additional facilities, including shipping containers presented as an "information centre" or an "information centre for the truth about the German crime in Jedwabne."

This shift is of considerable significance. Activities surrounding Jedwabne are no longer confined to publications, online posts, or isolated public statements. They are increasingly taking the form of a material presence in the space adjoining the memorial site. The containers, stage, organisational infrastructure, and announcements of regular events point to an attempt to establish an alternative narrative centre intended to marginalise established scholarly findings and weaken the social significance of official forms of commemoration.

In materials published by Sumliński, the site was described as a "place of resistance," "one of the last lines of resistance," a space of opposition to the "Polin vision," and to strategies aimed at combating antisemitism. Such descriptions are strongly confrontational. Their purpose extends beyond historical debate; they seek to construct a sense of threat and mobilise audiences against an alleged project of imposing responsibility on Poland for the Holocaust. Within this framework, the memory of the victims is transformed into an instrument of political and identity-based struggle.

The Jedwabne case should therefore be analysed as one of the important manifestations of post-Shoah antisemitism in 2025. It does not consist merely in the straightforward denial of historical facts but in the creation of an entire ecosystem comprising of books, promotional tours, films, fundraising campaigns, alternative installations, event infrastructure, and the mobilisation of political circles. This ecosystem enables the monetisation of the revisionist narrative, expands its reach, and builds a community of recipients around it.

From the perspective of the security of the Jewish community and the protection of memorial sites, it is particularly alarming that these activities are conducted in the immediate vicinity of the memorial to the victims. In this way, the site of remembrance becomes surrounded by an alternative narrative that may relativise the perpetrators' responsibility, undermine the dignity of the

victims, and reinforce hostility towards individuals and institutions engaged in defending historical memory. Within this model, Jedwabne ceases to function as a place of mourning and instead becomes a stage for confrontation.

From a broader perspective, this trend demonstrates that post-Shoah antisemitism is not confined to the online environment. It can take the form of organisational, financial, promotional, and spatial activities. In 2025, a visible attempt was made to establish a lasting presence within the symbolic space surrounding Jedwabne through the production of narratives, the sale of publications, fundraising campaigns, physical installations, and announcements of regular events. For this reason, in the coming years, monitoring activities surrounding memorial sites, particularly Jedwabne, will remain one of the key analytical priorities, alongside Holocaust denial, the distortion of historical truth, and Holocaust inversion.

The use of AI to generate antisemitic content

The reported material from 2025 revealed the use of generative AI to produce images, comments, songs, and video content. Generative artificial intelligence lowers the barrier to entry for individuals seeking to create and disseminate hateful content. It does not require graphic design, editing, or communication skills, nor does it require significant financial resources. It enables the rapid generation of images, memes, short texts, stylised graphics, videos, and other materials that appear visually appealing, professional, or credible. As a result, it has become easier to produce larger volumes of content that is both visually and rhetorically persuasive, more difficult to identify its source, and more challenging for audiences to determine whether they are encountering authentic material, manipulated content, or AI-generated fabrications.

In 2024, UNESCO warned[30] that generative AI could distort knowledge about the Holocaust, generate false historical content, and reinforce antisemitic hate narratives.

30 AI and the Holocaust: rewriting history? The impact of artificial intelligence on understanding the Holocaust, UNESCO 2024 *https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/new-unesco-report-warns-generative-ai-threatens-holocaust-memory* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

The red triangle as a visual marker used to identify individuals and institutions

The qualitative analysis should take into account the use of the red inverted triangle as a visual marker for identifying individuals, institutions, or content perceived as Jewish, Israeli, or "Zionist." In this context, the symbol does not function as a neutral graphic element. Rather, it serves as a visual shorthand: it identifies a target, stigmatises it, and facilitates the further mobilisation of users against the designated individual or group.

Particularly concerning is the use of this symbol to mark specific members of the Jewish community, individuals who publicly speak out against antisemitism, Jewish organisations, memorial institutions, or persons identified by perpetrators as "pro-Israeli" or "Zionist." In this context, the red inverted triangle does not function as a form of political commentary. Instead, it operates as a tool for identifying and exposing an individual to further symbolic violence, harassment, delegitimisation, or coordinated online attacks.

The significance of this phenomenon is particularly important in Poland because the the red inverted triangle symbol is not yet widely recognised or identified as a potential marker of hate. For some audiences, content moderators, public institutions, or bystanders, it may appear to be a neutral graphic element, an emoji, a warning sign, or simply an arbitrary visual form. In practice, however, within specific communicative contexts, it functions as a code understood by particular communities: it identifies who is to be regarded as the object of hostility.

In the Polish context, the principal challenge lies precisely in the limited public recognition of this code. While in some Western European countries the symbol has already been discussed in public debate as a potential hate marker[31] or as a symbol associated with terrorist propaganda, in Poland, its use may go unnoticed. This makes it more difficult to respond to content in which no explicit antisemitic slur, threat, or conventional hate symbol appears. Yet an individual or institution is nevertheless designated as a target. As a result, users may employ this symbol to circumvent content moderation, avoid accountability, or encode messages for a particular audience.

31 Versteckte Botschaften – Antisemitische Codes und Chiffren, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2026 *https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/allgemein/2026-05-antisemitische-codes-und-chiffren.pdf* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

Accordingly, in the analysed material, this symbol should be understood as an example of the shift from text-based antisemitism to visual and coded antisemitism. A single graphic symbol can replace a lengthy comment while simultaneously functioning as a call to action, a suggestion, a label, or a means of designating an individual as an object of hostility. Its power lies in its brevity: a single symbol can activate an entire set of meanings, from identifying a person as an "enemy," to assigning them collective responsibility, to encouraging further attacks against them.

For this reason, the use of the red inverted triangle in relation to members of the Jewish community should be monitored not merely as a graphic element but as a potential mechanism of stigmatisation and harassment. This requires raising awareness among public institutions, news organisations, platform moderators, civil society organisations, and law enforcement authorities, as failure to recognise the symbol may result in content being dismissed despite the fact that, for its intended targets, it carries an unequivocally intimidating or stigmatising meaning.

Increasingly, antisemitism is no longer expressed solely through overt insults but also through signs, codes, memes, abbreviations, and symbols that make it possible to designate individuals as "targets" without using explicit language of violence. For this reason, the analysis of contemporary trends must encompass not only words but also images, symbols, and visual methods of identifying members of the Jewish community.

Antisemitism, anti-Ukrainian sentiment, the "Ukropolin" myth, and other forms of discrimination

In 2025, antisemitism continued to co-occur with other forms of hostility, particularly anti-Ukrainian narratives. An additional anti-Ukrainian bias motive was identified in 77 reports, accounting for 6.7% of the analysed material. References to Ukraine, Zelenskyy, Bandera, Volhynia, or "Ukropolin" appeared in **123 cases** described in the reports.




Figure 12. Comment published on X. Screenshot taken on 13 June 2025.

The most characteristic feature of this group is the persistence of the "Ukropolin" myth, a conspiracy narrative suggesting the existence of a project directed against Polish sovereignty that allegedly links Jews, Ukraine, political elites, international institutions, and purported foreign interests. This type of narrative operates by exploiting social anxieties, including fears related to war, migration, economic crisis, the loss of security, and changes to the political order.

Within this structure, antisemitism functions as an interpretative framework. It organises diverse fears into a single conspiracy narrative centred on a hidden enemy. In this way, antisemitic hate speech does not occur in isolation but becomes part of a broader ecosystem of disinformation, polarisation, and hostility directed against other groups.

Antisemitism also functions here as an emotional trigger. It evokes strong affective responses, including fear, anger, humiliation, a sense of threat, and betrayal, which are subsequently directed against various groups perceived as "foreign" or "hostile." Within anti-Ukrainian narratives, the figure of the Jew frequently serves as the unifying element that binds dispersed social anxieties into a single emotionally compelling narrative centred on the loss of control, the subordination of Poland to external interests, hidden elites, and threats to the national community. In this way, antisemitism not only defines the alleged enemy but also amplifies the emotional intensity of the message, increases its mobilising potential, and facilitates the transfer of hostility to additional target groups.

Antisemitism is often not a standalone message but rather part of a broader exclusionary narrative. In many cases, Jews are associated with other groups portrayed as threats to the nation, morality, religion, the family, security, or sovereignty. Particularly evident is the convergence of antisemitism with misogyny, anti-Ukrainian hostility, racism, and hostility towards LGBTIQ people.

This trend demonstrates the intersectional nature of hateful content, in which antisemitism may serve as the primary conspiratorial framework while simultaneously reinforcing other forms of prejudice and, in turn, being reinforced by them.

Antisemitism as a symptom of declining trust and social resilience

The 2025 report does not merely document individual incidents targeting the Jewish community. Its purpose is also to demonstrate a broader social mechanism in which antisemitism functions as a means of interpreting reality, channelling social tensions, and facilitating political mobilisation. The analysed cases show that antisemitic content does not emerge solely as direct hostility towards Jews. Rather, it frequently forms part of broader narratives concerning crisis, betrayal, hidden control, the loss of sovereignty, cultural threat, or the alleged takeover of public institutions by "foreign" interest groups.

In this sense, antisemitism functions not only as a form of prejudice but also as an interpretative framework. It enables complex political, economic, and social processes to be portrayed as the result of a single hidden and hostile groups' actions. Jews, individuals identified as Jewish, as well as institutions, organisations, or public figures arbitrarily associated with "Jewish influence," are presented in such narratives as "outsiders," "perpetrators," "the establishment," "a threat," or as a group allegedly responsible for social crises, political decisions, cultural change, or economic inequality. This mechanism simplifies reality by identifying a convenient enemy and reinforcing the belief that social problems stem not from visible processes, institutions, or competing interests, but from the secret actions of concealed groups.

Antisemitism is frequently employed as a language of distrust, fear, anger, and perceived threat. In the analysed material, it appears as a means of expressing frustration towards political elites, public institutions, the media, international organisations, civil society organisations, the European Union, liberal democracy, or cultural change. Within these narratives, the term "Jew" does not always refer to a specific Jewish individual. Rather, it often becomes a symbolic figure, embodying ideas of otherness, manipulation, cosmopolitanism, national betrayal, financial control, or moral or physical threat. This is particularly significant because it demonstrates that antisemitism may also be present where the Jewish community is not explicitly mentioned, but where established codes, allusions, and conspiratorial tropes are employed.

Such language has consequences that extend beyond the direct threat posed to the Jewish community. It undermines social capital by reinforcing distrust, social fragmentation, and the belief hidden and hostile interest groups control public life. It fosters the perception that political or social opponents are not legitimate participants in democratic disagreement but agents of foreign influence. As a result, public debate becomes less rational, less secure, and more conducive to processes of radicalisation.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[32] has noted that discrimination weakens social cohesion and erodes the trust that enables everyday social interaction. Social trust is not an abstract concept. It translates into a willingness to cooperate, civic participation, a sense of security, and confidence that public institutions operate fairly and predictably. When part of society experiences exclusion, stigmatisation, or symbolic violence, not only is the security of that group diminished, but the quality of social relations as a whole also deteriorates. Discrimination is therefore not a problem affecting only one group. It affects society as a whole by reducing trust, increasing social distance, and normalising unequal treatment.

Similarly, research conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on the experiences of Jewish communities in Europe demonstrates that antisemitism is experienced both online and offline, affecting people's sense of security and their ability to participate freely in everyday life. The internet plays a particularly important role in this regard. On the one hand, it enables the rapid dissemination of antisemitic content, memes, conspiracy narratives, and incitement to hatred. On the other hand, it exposes individuals to hostility within a space that has become an integral part of contemporary social, professional, and civic life. Online antisemitism is therefore not a phenomenon detached from the "real world." It can reinforce feelings of insecurity, normalise violent language, and spill over into offline interactions.

The 2025 report also demonstrates that antisemitism should be analysed not merely as the sum of individual incidents but as a symptom of broader social processes. Its presence reflects the erosion of the norms governing public debate, increasing acceptance of dehumanising language, and growing susceptibility to conspiracy narratives. Particularly dangerous is the tendency for antisemitism to be presented as a "joke," a "provocation," a "political opinion," or "criticism of elites,"

32 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris 2024 *https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_9a20554b-en/full-report/socio-economic-conditions-political-agency-and-trust_a8fffb72.html* (accessed: 22.06.2026)

making it more difficult to recognise and respond to. This process of normalisation shifts the boundaries of acceptable public discourse and allows exclusionary content to become part of everyday political and online communication.

In this sense, the level, intensity, forms, and modes of antisemitic expression may serve as indicators of the condition of public debate, the quality of social trust, and democratic resilience. They reveal how a society responds to difference, manages conflict, defines community, and determines who is regarded as a legitimate participant in public life.

For this reason, combating antisemitism should be understood not only as protecting a single minority group, important though that objective is. It is also essential for safeguarding the quality of democracy, social security, and the resilience of public institutions. The response to antisemitism is a test of whether a society is capable of recognising mechanisms of exclusion, resisting disinformation, and defending the standards of public debate. An effective response requires not only the documentation of incidents but also the analysis of the language, contexts, dissemination channels, and the social and political functions served by antisemitic narratives.

7. Summary

The year 2025 demonstrated that antisemitism in Poland has neither disappeared, diminished, nor become less socially harmful. What has changed, however, is the dynamic of its manifestations. Increasingly, antisemitism is observed not merely in the form of isolated statements but as a recurring mechanism of hatred.

Particularly striking was the memefication of antisemitism. Obscene anti-Jewish slogans functioned not only as comments but also as choruses, songs, recordings, and online performances. These materials were repeatedly reproduced, adapted, performed, and disseminated across a variety of formats. As a result, antisemitism is increasingly becoming embedded within participatory online culture, functioning as a joke, a provocation, a form of self-presentation, or a marker of belonging to a particular emotional community.

The year 2025 also demonstrated the strong relationship between antisemitism and political mobilisation and polarisation. Particularly prominent were conspiracy narratives concerning “foreign influence,” “Polin,” “Jewish claims,” the alleged control of public life, and the collective responsibility of Jews for political and social developments. During the same period, there was also an increase in content denying or distorting the Holocaust, including statements concerning Auschwitz-Birkenau and the gas chambers.

It is also important to emphasise the intersectional character of contemporary hate speech. In 2025, antisemitism frequently intersected with sexism, anti-Ukrainian hostility, racism, and hostility towards LGBTIQ people. Particularly persistent were conspiracy narratives linking Jews, Ukraine, political elites, and international institutions into a single narrative portraying them as a threat to Polish sovereignty. Within this framework, antisemitism functions as an emotional trigger: it organises fear, anger, and a sense of lost control, and then directs these emotions against groups portrayed as “foreign” or “hostile.”

The report of the Jewish Association Czulent does more than simply document facts. It brings them out of the shadows, from a sphere often overlooked by official statistics, public indifference, and mechanisms that downplay hatred. As such, it makes an important contribution to understanding both the scale and the specific characteristics of a problem that is too often underestimated or marginalised. Detailed and systematic analysis is an essential prerequisite for an effective zero-tolerance policy. Without reliable knowledge of what is happening, where it is occurring, and how it manifests itself, it is impossible to develop appropriate and effective measures to counter antisemitism.

General education promoting tolerance alone is not sufficient. The time has come to recognise that antisemitism is a phenomenon rooted in a specific historical context, sustained by the mechanisms of stereotyping, exclusion, and conspiratorial thinking described in social psychology, and produ-

If you experience
antisemitism
or witness it,
report it!

Visit
zglosantysemityzm.pl
or call:
12 400 00 08

**Your report
matters**



cing real and deeply harmful consequences. Antisemitism will not disappear on its own. Combating it requires courage, consistency, and profound awareness. This responsibility rests not only with politicians and public institutions but also with the media, digital platforms, businesses, civil society organisations, teachers, and every participant in public debate. Only through a collective and determined effort can we break this destructive cycle and build a society that is resilient to hatred, disinformation, and polarisation.

8. zglosantysemityzm.pl

www.zglosantysemityzm.pl and the helpline 12 400 00 08 are tools for monitoring and countering antisemitism in Poland, operated by the Jewish Association Czulent. Their purpose is to provide victims and witnesses with an easy, safe, and anonymous way to report antisemitic incidents.

Through the online form or the helpline, it is possible to report both incidents that constitute legal violations and other manifestations of antisemitism, including hate speech, verbal abuse, symbolic violence, acts of vandalism, and cases of discrimination.

Support for affected individuals submitting reports includes:

- an assessment of whether a given incident constitutes a criminal offence or a bias-motivated incident;
- consultations on possible legal actions and available protective measures;
- information about the institutions and procedures relevant for further handling of the case;
- support in documenting the incident.

What happens to a report?

- reports are anonymised and subjected to expert analysis;
- data is classified in accordance with the methodology for monitoring antisemitism and used to analyse trends and contemporary forms of antisemitism;
- in the case of online incidents, we take steps to remove harmful content. Using Trusted Partner status and cooperation with European partners, reports are forwarded to social media platform administrators and other online service providers, requesting the blocking or removal of materials that violate platform rules and the rights of affected individuals;
- in cases requiring intervention, actions are taken with relevant public institutions or entities responsible for removing the consequences of the incident, such as antisemitic inscriptions or graffiti;
- in cases that may contribute to changes in legal practice or improvements in the protection of affected persons, strategic litigation may be initiated, subject to the consent of the affected individual;
- aggregated results are published in reports and used in educational and advocacy activities;
- selected examples of incidents are used to improve the competencies of institutions responsible for responding to bias-motivated crimes.

Every report not only helps provide support to individuals affected by antisemitism but also contributes to a better understanding of the scale, nature, and evolving forms of this phenomenon in Poland.

9. Biographies:

Joanna Grabarczyk-Anders – A social activist with 15 years of experience in hate speech, bias--motivated crimes, and online safety - co-creator of the Hejtstop campaign. Expert cooperating with the Jewish Association Czulent. Chair of the Team for Counteracting Hate Speech and Bias--Motivated Crimes at the Prosecutor General's Office.

Her expertise includes conducting research, analyses, and preparing reports on the scale of hate-motivated incidents, the use of hateful content in election campaigns, the removal of illegal content by IT service providers, and the phenomena of disinformation on social media platforms.

She also specialises in issues related to underreporting within minority organisations. As a qualified trainer in online safety, hate speech, and bias-motivated crime, she conducts training for various professional groups, including prosecutors, police officers, the Border Guard, attorneys, content moderators, and minority organisations. Her areas of interest also include platform liability for content, securing and collecting evidentiary material, and identifying perpetrators of crimes.

Anna Zielińska – An expert in tolerance and non-discrimination. Member of the board of the Jewish Association Czulent, focusing on hate crimes, hate speech, antisemitism, and advocacy. Member of the Steering Committee of the ENCATE network and member of the Executive Committee of the International Council of Jewish Women (ICJW). Member of the advisory board of the Centre for Combating Antisemitism and Intolerance in Belgrade. She previously served as an advisor on combating antisemitism at the OSCE/ODIHR at the Warsaw Jewish Religious Community.

She holds a law degree from the University of Warsaw and Cambridge British Law School, as well as postgraduate studies in Middle Eastern politics and history from Tel Aviv University. Her advocacy work began with a fellowship at the Washington, D.C. office of the American Jewish Committee and by leading two conferences on the Middle East organised in Poland for AIPAC. She is the author of publications on international law, tolerance, and non-discrimination.

Anna Chipczyńska – An activist in the Polish Jewish community. Member of the Board of the Jewish Association Czulent since 2024, and Chair of the Board of the Warsaw Jewish Religious Community from 2014 to 2018. Member of the Advisory Council on Resilience to International Disinformation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Her work focuses on advocacy, public participation, building partnerships and alliances, and managing civil society organisations. She has been awarded the commemorative medal "Warsaw Ghetto Uprising" for her contribution to Polish-Jewish reconciliation and her engagement in combating antisemitism.

She is a graduate of the University of Warsaw, Central European University, and BPP Law School in London, and was a scholarship holder at Tel Aviv University (2003–2004). In the past, she has also worked with the World Jewish Congress and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

Piotr Kwapisiewicz – expert in human rights, public policy, and minority participation in public life. For more than 17 years, he has supported public authorities, civil society organisations, and international institutions in developing policies, programmes, and recommendations grounded in a human rights perspective. He specialises in building cross-sector cooperation. His experience also includes countering hate speech and bias-motivated crime, with particular emphasis on their impact on local communities and democratic processes.

He is an alumnus of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Minorities Fellowship Programme and a graduate of the School for Leaders of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation. He has worked, among others, with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the European Judicial Training Network, and numerous public institutions and civil society organisations in Poland and across Europe. He serves as President of the Board of the Jewish Association Czulent.

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The Jewish Association Czulent is an independent advocacy organisation working to promote a democratic, open, and resilient society grounded in human rights. We focus on preventing and responding to discrimination and bias-motivated crime, treating them not only as violations of individual rights but also as threats to democratic stability, social trust, and the quality of public institutions.

Our work combines legal, social, and educational perspectives. We use data analysis, new technologies, and interdisciplinary expertise to identify emerging threats, design systemic solutions, and support institutions in developing effective public policies.

We carry out advocacy activities, monitor manifestations of hate, and develop tools and strategies to counter discrimination, disinformation, and polarisation. Through the *zglosantysemityzm.pl* platform, we provide free legal assistance to people affected by hate crime. We also strengthen minority communities and organisations by developing their capacities and providing tools that enable active participation in public life and help ensure that their perspectives are reflected in decision-making processes at the local and national levels.

We also act as a knowledge broker, producing analyses, reports, and recommendations that support public institutions, local authorities, and civil society organisations in designing evidence-based responses. We facilitate the exchange of knowledge between researchers, policymakers, and practitioners in order to counter radicalisation effectively and strengthen democratic resilience.

We work with more than 60 partners in Poland and across Europe, including public authorities, local governments, universities, and civil society organisations. We are active in European networks such as ENCATE, ENMA, and CCOA, jointly developing strategies and solutions at the European Union level and strengthening the participation of civil society in shaping public policy.



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